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DEFINING REGULATORY OBJECTIVES FOR 
CONTEMPORARY ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS: 
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
 
 
Mira Burri-Nenova * 
 
Goal evaluation is an essential element of the process of designing regulatory frameworks. Lawyers and legal 
scholars do however tend to ignore it. The present article stresses the importance of pinpointing the precise 
regulatory objectives in the fluid environment of electronic communications, since, due to their technological and 
economic development, they have become the vital basis for communication and distribution of information in 
modern societies. The article attempts an analysis of the underlying regulatory objectives in contemporary 
communications and seeks to put together the complex puzzle of economic and societal issues. 
 
The common mantra in telecommunications1 regulatory fora (be it national, regional or 
international) now goes along the lines of “deregulation – good; regulation – bad” and 
competition is said to be the ultimate answer to basically every question. Such a generalised 
dictum is in itself suspicious and even more so, when it refers to a sector such as 
telecommunications, which has a history of particularly heavy regulation and has been the very 
epitome of State intervention. 
In the contemporary environment of vibrant communications, subscribing to a purely 
“black-or-white” approach may be, to put it mildly, unsafe. Before answering the question of the 
appropriate regulatory model for communications, it is essential to figure out what goals are to 
be pursued in order to consider what kind of measures could bring about their attainment. In the 
words of Robert Bork, “[o]nly when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a 
coherent body of substantive rules”.2 
Arguably, a brief look into the telecommunications-specific laws would suffice to identify 
the goals. Article 8 of the Framework Directive3 of the current European Community (EC) 
                                                 
* World Trade Institute, University of Berne − Senior Research Fellow − November 2007 
1 The terms “telecommunications”, “electronic communications” and “communications” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. “Electronic communications” is the term coined by the 2002 EC framework 
for electronic communications. The scope of electronic communications (also known in EC jargon as “e-
communications”) is, strictly speaking, more extensive than that of “telecommunications”, since it covers all 
electronic communications services and/or networks, which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by wire, 
radio, optical or other electromagnetic means (i.e. fixed, wireless, cable television, satellite networks), including the 
transmission and broadcasting of radio and television programmes. See Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 
September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 249/21, 
17 September 2002, at Recital 7. All web addresses within the text as last visited on 1 November 2007. 
2 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York: The Free Press, 1993 (first 
published New York: Basic Books, 1978), at 50. 
3 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108/33, 24 April 2002 
(hereinafter the Framework Directive). For the 2007 proposal, see European Commission, Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services, COM(2007) 697 final, 13 November 2007. 
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communications regime supports such an opinion and defines as policy objectives to be 
pursued by the national regulatory agencies, three major goals: (i) promotion of competition; 
(ii) contribution to the development of the internal market; and (iii) promotion of the interests of 
the citizens of the European Union (EU), including consumer protection and the provision of 
universal service. Such an example however is not readily available in every regulatory space 
and more importantly, may not necessarily identify all the goals, the ultimate or the right ones. 
That is why the analysis of the present article, although based upon the EC experience, will 
not be constrained by it. It goes beyond the goals of EC communications regulation and seeks to 
explore which goals are of general relevance in the communications sector. Therewith, we shall 
also distinguish between the objectives pursued by the policy and the objectives that are assigned 
to the regulatory agencies in charge of implementing that policy, as reflected in the legal 
framework within which they function.4 In this examination of the essential policy objectives 
pertinent to electronic communications, our methodological approach will be a mixed one – it 
will be founded on the EC legal bases and past experience, as well as on academic research and 
normative recommendations in the broader context of good governance.5 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned above, historically, the telecommunications sector has been particularly 
heavily regulated. While part of the rationale for the burdensome regulation was the natural 
monopoly characteristics of the industry, another (important) part was the different perception of 
the industry’s role. Indeed, telecommunications have always been considered a “business 
affected with a public interest”,6 although the precise definition of the public interest has 
changed over time and even more impressively so, the measures for the achievement of the 
public interest goals. At the outset of their development, telecommunications were simply 
important for point-to-point communication within strictly national limits, and later, on a 
transnational level as well. In that context, governments regulated them as public services and 
took account of spectrum scarcity, national security and defence. Public authorities were given 
control of the national networks and the services provided through them. The entities responsible 
for telecommunications were organised as monopolies whose activities were exempt from the 
                                                 
4 Such a distinction is necessary since the objectives embodied in the legal regime may differ from the ultimate 
policy objectives. The first reason for this divergence is the constraints under which the institutions operate. The 
mandate of the regulatory agency is limited and clearly defined so that the agency can properly fulfil it. If broad 
discretion in implementation could be easily abused, for instance, it may be desirable to formulate the institution’s 
tasks in terms of simplified rules. This might in practice lead to a loss of precision in implementation with respect to 
the ultimate objective, but could be far less damaging than leaving implementation of general objectives open to 
capture by particular interest groups or by the implementing agency itself. The second reason for divergence 
involves strategic interactions that may occur between the institution in charge and other agents concerned with the 
policy. The theory of delegation provides the important insight that a particular objective may be best achieved 
indirectly, by delegating responsibility for achieving it to an agent with a different objective. Finally, since a 
concrete legal regime corresponds to a certain period of application, the goals formulated in that regime might be 
focused on certain transitory problems that are peripheral to the ultimate policy objectives. See Damien Neven, 
“Working Paper on Competition Policy Objectives” in Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine L. Laudati (eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart, 1998, 
at  111-112. 
5 See e.g. European Commission, European Governance: White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001. 
6 William H. Melody, “Policy Objectives and Models of Regulation” in William. H. Melody (ed.), Telecom 
Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, Lyngby: Technical University of Denmark, 1997, 11- 24, at 
 12. 
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general rules of competition and subject to specific regulation. The objective of the 
regulation during this period, although not necessarily explicitly defined, was the provision of 
telecommunications services at affordable prices to the public and access to all citizens across 
the national territory to basic telecom services, which meant in essence, “a telephone in every 
home”.7 
The telecommunications sector no longer fits the straitjacket of public service. Plain voice 
telephony service has been replaced with the idea of the Information Society8 and the objectives 
of communications regulation have been adjusted accordingly. In the dynamic new world of 
electronic communications, the identification of the regulatory objectives is critically important 
and at the same time, increasingly difficult. Despite the possibility of finding ourselves between 
a rock and a hard place, we shall attempt to pinpoint some of the most relevant goals in the 
communications regulatory space. 
Since electronic communications is a sector that touches upon, and indeed influences, 
multiple facets of economic and social reality, the goals to be pursued are equally varied. One 
could differentiate between economic and societal goals, although as we shall see below, these 
overlap in many respects. For the sake of clarity, this article will discuss the economic (Part One) 
and the societal objectives (Part Two) as distinct categories. Innovation and universal service 
will be examined as concrete models illustrating the complexity of the issues behind an 
economic and a societal goal of communications regulation. 
II. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
A. Consumer Welfare 
When one talks now about the economic objectives of regulation, as conventional wisdom 
has it, one is talking about competition (hence the above-mentioned mantra). The roots of the 
concept of competition can be traced back to the beginning of economic science: Adam Smith, 
the father of the “invisible hand” theory of welfare, viewed competition as the force driving 
economies to the best outcomes that are feasible.9 Although the underlying economic theories of 
antitrust have changed over the years,10 a competitive market driven by entrepreneurship is still 
                                                 
7 Colin R. Blackman, “Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?” (1995) Telecommunications Policy, 
19:3, 171-176, at 171. 
8 On the concept of Information Society, see infra Section 2.3. 
9 Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern Library, 
1937 (first published 1776). Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3300. The most well-known and cited 
passage therein is: “He [specifically each individual] generally, indeed neither intends to promote the public interest, 
not knows how much he is promoting it…[He] intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention”. As cited by Patrick Van Cayseele & 
Roger Van den Bergh, “Antitrust Law” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Law 
and Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000, 467-497, at 469 (emphasis added). 
10 For an overview of the different schools of economic thought from the Harvard through the Chicago School 
to the game-theory models, see Patrick Van Cayseele & Roger Van den Bergh, id. With a more specific regard to 
EC competition law, see Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, at 3-60; Mel Kenny, The Transformation of Public and Private EC Competition Law, Berne: 
Staempfli, 2002, at 114-134; Doris Hildebrand, “The European School of EC Competition Law” (2002) World 
Competition, 25:1, 3-23. On the debate on the objectives of EC competition law, see Claus Dieter Ehlermann & 
Laraine L. Laudati (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy, 
Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart, 1998, especially at 1-133. 
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believed to make the most efficient use of resources and to be the best allocator of wealth 
among society’s members.11 
But competition is not an end in itself. It is the means for achieving the ultimate goal of 
economic policy, including the one applicable to communications, which is, according to modern 
economic theory, consumer welfare.12 The consumer welfare approach sees competition as 
ensuring allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency in the economy. These three 
interdependent categories imply respectively that: (i) under the circumstances of allocative 
efficiency – firms employ resources and productive energies to produce goods and services that 
provide maximum benefit to society; (ii) under the circumstances of productive efficiency – 
firms have the appropriate incentives to produce services at the lowest cost and production 
activities are distributed between firms so that industry-wide costs are minimised; and finally, 
(iii) under dynamic efficiency – firms have the appropriate incentives to invest, innovate, 
improve the range and quality of services, increase productivity and lower costs over time. 
Collectively, these generic benefits of competition provide maximisation of wealth at the lowest 
possible cost to society, the consumer13 being the ultimate beneficiary of the competitive market 
forces. 
The goal of regulation in the above context is to ensure that these efficiencies are present. In 
Western economies and, increasingly in all world economies, this is coordinated to a significant 
extent by the market mechanisms.14 In fact, according to theoretical models, it can be 
demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, the allocation of resources by means of market 
                                                 
11 “…[O]n the whole, markets deliver better outcomes than state planning; and central to the idea of a market is 
the process of competition”. See Richard Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed., London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003, 
at 2. For examples on the beneficial role of competition, see Stephen Davies, Heather Coles, Matthew Olczak, 
Christopher Pike & Christopher Wilson, The Benefits from Competition: Some Illustrative UK Cases, DTI 
Economics Paper No 9, July 2004. For the benefits of deregulation in telecommunications, see J. Gregory Sidak & 
Daniel F. Spulber, “Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries” (1998) Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 15:1, 117-147, at 120 et seq. 
12 The surplus of a given consumer is taken to be the difference between the consumer’s valuation of the good 
at issue (willingness to pay) and the price that he/she effectively has to pay for it. Consumer welfare (or consumer 
surplus) is then the combined surpluses of all consumers. The surplus of an individual producer, on the other hand, 
is the profit he/she makes by selling the good in question. Producer welfare (or surplus) is the sum of all profits 
made by producers in the industry. Economic welfare is a measure that aggregates both consumer welfare and 
producer welfare. In practice, it is sometimes difficult to see whether competition authorities favour, as an objective, 
consumer or total economic welfare. In the EC jurisdiction, as well as in the US, antitrust authorities and the courts 
seem to favour consumer welfare as the standard. See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, at 18-22. On consumer welfare in US antitrust decisions, see Jerry 
A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, “A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks” (1999) The Yale Law Journal, 109, 417-505, at 452 et seq.; Lawrence J. Spiwak, 
“Antitrust, the ‘Public Interest’ and Competition Policy: The Search for Meaningful Definition in a Sea of 
Analytical Rhetoric” (1997) Antitrust Report, 2-23. 
13 That is in a situation that we construe economic welfare as consumer welfare. However, even when we take 
it as a total surplus (id.), that is the sum of consumer and producer welfare, the consumers could be identified as the 
ultimate beneficiaries, since in most cases, producers are in effect consumers themselves.  
14 The XXIX Report on Competition Policy states in that regard: “The first objective of competition policy is 
the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an instrument to encourage industrial 
efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to a changing 
environment”. See European Commission, XXIX Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, 2000, at 6. See also 
Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 291/1, 13 October 2000, [2001] 2 CMLR 1074, at para. 7. 
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mechanisms is optimal.15 Such conditions however seldom exist in reality and there is a 
demand for instruments for promoting efficiency and improving allocation. The public interest 
theory of regulation holds that government regulation can be the appropriate tool for overcoming 
the disadvantages of the market mechanism in situations such as imperfect competition, unstable 
market equilibrium, unbalanced market operation or undesirable market results.16 Although this 
theory has been criticised because it takes for granted the effectiveness of the applied 
government regulatory tools and ignores phenomena, such as imperfect information and 
partiality of policy makers,17 it remains true that some kind of regulation is needed where market 
failures occur. 
The telecommunications industry is a vivid example of the changed views on economic 
regulation. The sector used to be heavily regulated precisely because it was believed that it 
constituted a natural monopoly, i.e. a case of imperfect competition, where due to the inherent 
high sunk costs, network effects, economies of scale and scope, it was more efficient (or so it 
seemed) to have only one operator on the market.18 The enforced telecommunications regulation 
was meant to “correct” the undesirable effects and promote efficient allocation by certain 
restrictions on the market and on the organisation entitled with monopoly functions. This 
monopolistic view of telecommunications is no longer supported19 and now it is the market itself 
that is responsible for bringing about the generic benefits of competition, as clearly exemplified 
by the current EC regulatory approach to electronic communications.20 
B. Other Economic Objectives 
While consumer welfare and the corresponding efficiencies are the core objective of 
economic regulation, it is often the case that economic policy is instrumentalised for the 
achievement of other objectives.21 In the EC context, for instance, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) stated in its seminal Metro judgment that, “the requirements for the maintenance of 
workable competition may be reconciled with the safeguarding of ‘objectives of different nature’ 
                                                 
15 Kenneth J. Arrow, “The Potential and Limits of the Market in Resource Allocation” in George R. Feiwel 
(ed.), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, London: Macmillan, 1985, 107-124, as referred to by 
Johan den Hertog, “General Theories of Regulation” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, supra note 9, 223-
270, at 225. 
16 For representatives of the public interest theory, see e.g. Kenneth J. Arrow, “The Organization of Economic 
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation” in Robert H. Haveman & Julius 
Margolis (eds.), Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, Chicago: Rand MacNally, 1970, 67-81; Martin Shubik, 
“On Different Methods for Allocating Resources” (1970) Kyklos, 13, 332-338. 
17 For an overview of the shortcomings of the public interest theory, see e.g. Johan den Hertog, supra note 15, 
at 231-235. 
18 On natural monopoly theory and regulation, see e.g. William Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 
Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1999; Ben W. F. Depoorter, “Regulation of Natural Monopoly” in Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, supra note 9, 498-532; Rick Geddes, “Public Utilities”, id. 1162-1205; Massimo 
Motta, supra note 12, at 39-89. 
19 For an overview of the different theories challenging natural monopoly regulation, see Rick Geddes, id. at 
1165 et seq. For the institutional economics rationale, see Jean-Michel Glachant, “Why Regulate Deregulated 
Network Industries?” (2002) Journal of Network Industries, 3, 297-311. 
20 The potential of competition has been empirically proven by the development of the telecommunications 
sector since it was opened to competition. The European Commission reports on the state of the telecommunications 
markets provide an excellent account of this. For the current state of affairs, see European Commission, European 
electronic communications regulation and markets 2005, COM(2006) 68 final, 20 February 2006. 
21 See e.g. Massimo Motta, supra note 12, at 23. 
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and that to this end certain restrictions on competition are permissible, provided that they are 
essential to the attainment of those objectives and that they do not result in elimination of 
competition for a substantial part of the Common Market”.22 Taking into account the macro-
dimension of the European project, these “objectives of different nature” are related above all to 
the promotion of market integration,23 “involv[ing] the elimination of all obstacles to intra 
community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about 
conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market”.24  
The internal market is a Community-specific goal that distinguishes EC law from its US (or 
other national25) counterparts, where such an objective is absent. In the EC frame, when “[f]aced 
with a conflict between the narrow interests of a particular firm and the broader problem of 
integrating the market, the tendency [of the European institutions] will be to subordinate the 
former to the latter”.26 Although the realisation of the internal market (as a matter of regional 
integration) has its solid justification in economic theory,27 the pursuit of other economic goals is 
questioned and criticised, in particular as far as application of antitrust is concerned.28 It should 
however be noted that the underlying market integration rationale, which dominated EC 
competition law at the outset of its development,29 has been increasingly eroded with the actual 
achievement of the single market. The generic benefits of competition, i.e. the purely economic 
rationale of competition for achieving efficiency, have gradually come to the fore. This 
“economic turn”30 is to be seen together with a “public turn” towards formulation and pursuit of 
a multitude of policy objectives other than market integration.31 
                                                 
22 Case 26/76 Metro SB – Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission (Metro I) [1977] ECR 1875, [1978] 2 
CMLR 1, at para. 1905 (emphasis added). 
23 Although it should be noted that, as the case law of the European Courts and the practice of the EC 
institutions have shown, the “objectives of different nature” in the sense of the Metro judgment, may also involve 
policy considerations other than market integration, such as the promotion of small and medium enterprises or 
diversity of market players. On these “other” goals, see e.g. Richard Whish, supra note 11, at 17-20; Massimo 
Motta, supra note 12, at 15-17, 26-30. 
24 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane-Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1982] ECR 
1409, at paras. 1431-1432. See also Articles 2 and 3 EC, as well as Titles I, II and VI. 
25 It should however be noted that some federal states, such as, for instance, Switzerland, do have regulations 
ensuring the creation and maintenance of a single market. See Bundesgesetz über den Binnenmarkt of 6 October 
1995, SR 943.02, BBl 1995 IV 548. 
26 Richard Whish, supra note 11, at 21. 
27 For a comprehensive analysis, see Richard E. Baldwin & Charles Wyplozs, The Economics of European 
Integration, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003. See also Paolo Cecchini (Rapporteur-General), The Cost of Non-
Europe, Report prepared for the European Commission, Brussels, 29 March 1988. 
28 From the perspective of US antitrust, the EC competition law is often criticised for not being efficiency-
based and for pursuing non-economic goals. See e.g. Roger Van den Bergh, “Modern Industrial Organisation versus 
Old-Fashioned European Competition Law” (1996) European Competition Law Review, 17, 75-87. See also 
Lawrence J. Spiwak, supra note 12; Robert H. Bork, supra note 2. 
29 Seminal cases on the broad interpretation of the internal market goal are Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten 
and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, [1966] CMLR 418 and Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt 
[1969] ECR 1, [1969] CMLR 100. 
30 On the economic turn of EC competition law, see Mel Kenny, supra note 10, at 101-218. For arguments for 
an enhanced economic methodology in the application of Article 82 EC, see Economic Advisory Group for 
Competition Policy (EAGCP), “An Economic Approach to Article 82”, EAGCP Report for DG COMP, July 2005. 
31 See e.g. infra Section 2.1 on universal service. A similar “public turn” observation has been made by Herbert 
Burkert in the context of EC telecommunications policy. See Herbert Burkert, “The Post-Deregulatory Landscape in 
International Telecommunications Law: A Unique European Union Approach” (2002) Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, XXVII:3, 739-816. 
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C. Innovation As A Distinct Objective 
In the context of the electronic communications industry and in accounting for its unique 
dynamism, it is perhaps worth placing additional stress on innovation32 as a key objective among 
the economic goals of communications regulation. While innovation is undoubtedly important 
for the development of any sector of the economy,33 it is particularly critical for electronic 
communications, which are driven by and highly dependent on innovative advances.34 We 
suggest that in the communications environment, innovation has become an objective in itself 
and not necessarily, as a constituent element of other policy goals.35 Taking a closer look at 
innovation will serve as a model to illustrate the complexity of issues behind any one of the 
economic goals of communications regulation and the subordinate regulatory decisions that need 
to be made in the specific environment of electronic communications. 
Innovation is associated with one of the generic benefits of competition, namely the 
achievement of dynamic efficiency, under which firms have the appropriate incentives to 
improve the range and quality of their products and services, and to invest and innovate. It could 
further be linked to the general goal of governments of achieving sustainability.36 If compared to 
the other static types of efficiency, dynamic efficiency could, in the long term, lead to the 
greatest improvement in social welfare.37 
Unfortunately, unlike other economic parameters (e.g. output or productivity), innovation is 
notoriously difficult to measure.38 The economic theory itself expresses contradictory views on 
the relation between competition and innovation, ranging from the Schumpeterian hypotheses,39 
                                                 
32 The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (6th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) defines 
innovation as: (i) the introduction of new things, ideas or ways of doing something; (ii) a new idea, way of doing 
something, etc. A more politically loaded definition given by the organisation London Innovation reads: “Innovation 
is the successful exploitation of new ideas and is a vital ingredient for competitiveness, productivity and social gain 
within businesses and organisations”. See http://www.london-innovation.org.uk. In the present paper, innovation 
will be understood as having its broadest meaning of research and development, invention and creation of new 
technologies, products and services (endogenous innovation), as well as the adoption of these by the relevant 
markets (exogenous innovation). On the roots of innovation, see Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
33 Paul Romer, “Endogenous Technological Growth” (1990) The Journal of Political Economy, 98:5, S71-
S102. 
34 For evidence, see Knut Blind et al., “New Products and Services: Analysis of Regulations Shaping New 
Markets”, Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research Study funded by the European Commission, 
Karlsruhe, February 2004, at 76. See also Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, “Regulation and Innovation in the 
Telecommunications Industry” (2001) Telecommunications Policy, 25, 167-184, at 169. 
35 Article 8(2)(c) of the Framework Directive, for instance, has included the “promotion of innovation” as an 
explicit policy objective for the national communications agencies. See also the multiple initiatives of the EC in the 
field of promotion of innovation and R&D at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/innovation/index_en.htm. 
36 See e.g. Robert N. Stavins, Alexander Wagner & Gernot Wagner, “Interpreting Sustainability in Economic 
Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity”, Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2002-
02, Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2002. 
37 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 167-168. On the importance of dynamic efficiency, see 
also Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, “The Impact of Regulation on Facility-Based Competition in 
Telecommunications: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Developments in North America and the European 
Union”, 1999, available at http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~m3i/related-work/cm/Cost-Regulation-in-
TelecomsKiess_Mar99.pdf, at 4, referring also to Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd 
ed., New York: Harper, 1950, at 140. 
38 See Patrick Van Cayseele & Roger Van den Bergh, supra note 9, at 471. 
39 Joseph A. Schumpeter, supra note 37. 
 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y [Iss.12  282
which stress the positive effects of market concentration and firm size on innovation40 to the 
suggestion of X-inefficiency of monopolies and cartels leading to their “laziness” and 
“organisational slack”.41 Empirical research has proven none of these extremes true. Rather it 
“tends to suggest that neither monopolists nor fierce competitors have a superior track record in 
this respect, but it would seem clear that the assertion that only monopolists can innovate is 
incorrect”.42 
The relation between regulation and innovation has an equally shaky foundation.43 In 
general, regulation could affect the innovation of market players either through price regulations 
that would alter the industry profits and consequently, the stimulus to innovate, or through entry 
regulation that would influence innovation decisions regarding new entry.44 In the electronic 
communications sector, however, some exogenous and (above all) endogenous factors could 
make the conventional conclusions questionable. 
First and foremost, telecommunications bear the historical burden of monopoly. This means 
that in many markets, even now, after liberalisation, the incumbents are in a dominant or near-
dominant position and have, among other benefits, the “first-mover” advantage.45 They could 
exploit this to enable them to invade new markets or “colonise” neighbouring ones with their 
own technology and/or standard. Due to the network effects46 inherent to the industry, it might 
                                                 
40 An example in point is the Bell Laboratories founded by the US monopolist AT&T in 1925, which had 
developed some groundbreaking technologies, such as inter alia the transistor, the laser, the cellular telephone 
technology, communications satellites and the Unix operating system. On Bell Labs, see e.g. S. Millman (ed.), A 
History of Science and Engineering in the Bell System: Communication Sciences (1925-1980), Murray Hill, NL: 
Bell Laboratories, 1984; Narain Gehani, Bell Labs: Life in the Crown Jewel, Summit, NJ: Silicon Press, 2003. See 
also http://www.bell-labs.com. 
41 Harvey Leibenstein, “Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency’” (1966) American Economic Review, 56, 
392-415 and “’X-Inefficiency’ Xists – Reply to an Xorcist” (1978) American Economic Review, 68, 203-211. For 
more on the relation between competition and innovation, see Patrick Van Cayseele, “Market Structure and 
Innovation: A Survey of the Last Twenty Years” (1998) De Economist, 146, 391-417. See also Frederic M. Scherer, 
Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984; Frederic M. Scherer & 
David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd ed., Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. 
42 Richard Whish, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasis added), referring also to Frederic M. Scherer & David Ross, 
id. at Chapter 17. On the uncertainty of the relation between the firm’s size and innovation, see also Massimo Motta, 
supra note 12, at 22 and 56 et seq. 
43 Although it is clear that regulation does influence innovation, its impact is difficult to assess and could be 
controversial. See e.g. Knut Blind et al., supra note 34, at 1 and 7 et seq. For a comparison of different types of 
regulation and their impact on innovation, see id. Table 2.4.2, at 16. 
44 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 168. 
45 A pertinent example is the recently planned attempt of the Microsoft Corporation, which has a near-
monopoly position in operating systems, to invade voice communications with a new software package called Office 
Communicator. See John Markoff, “New Microsoft Products to Take Ground from Phones”, The New York Times, 
9 March 2005. 
46 On network economics, see Stanley J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, “Network Externality: An 
Uncommon Tragedy” (1994) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8:2, 1-26; Stanley J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, “Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?” (1995) Research in Law and Economics, 
17, 1-22; William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, “Network Externalities” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, 
supra note 9, 952-980; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects” (1994) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 93-115; Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules, Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1999; Nicholas Economides, “The Economics of Networks” (1996) International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 16:4, 673-699; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, “Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects” (1998) California Law Review, 86, 79 et seq.; Heli Koski & Tobias Kretschmer, 
“Survey on Competing in Network Industries: Firm Strategies, Market Outcomes, and Policy Implications” (2004) 
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (Bank Papers), 5-31. 
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be hard for other firms to overcome this substantial advantage of incumbents, even if they 
possess a technology of higher quality.47  
When considering the presence of network externalities in electronic communications in the 
present context of innovation, one also has to consider the scope of the network at issue. In 
network markets, the size of the network is of primary significance both for market players and 
for consumers in the process of making strategic decisions and choices. Networks become more 
valuable, the larger they are. Once they gain a certain critical mass, the owner of the network has 
the power to determine conditions and/or standards and because of the positive network effects, 
could grow even bigger, and consequently gain yet more power.48 In the extreme, the winner 
takes all.49  
It is characteristic of network environments that the size of the network does not necessarily 
depend only on the quality and price of the services or products offered, which would normally 
convince consumers to make a certain choice, but also on the expectations about the size of the 
network. The larger the network, the more attractive it is and the more people are willing to join 
in. In the words of Shapiro and Varian, “[t]he beautiful if frightening implication [is that] success 
and failure are driven as much by consumer expectations and luck as by the underlying value of 
the product. A nudge in the right direction, at the right time, can make all the difference”.50 
This rather unstable and erratic network environment has serious consequences for 
innovation. Under such circumstances, the demand for and the adoption of new technologies, 
which is an essential part of the innovation process,51 could be pre-determined by the lock-in 
effects52 of existing large networks (the most notorious example of this is the Windows operating 
system53). People would adopt a technology that others have already adopted or are expected to 
do so. Thus, a path dependence of adoption54 emerges, which is difficult to overcome, even in a 
situation, where a hypothetically superior technology is available. 
                                                 
47 See Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY” (1985) American Economic Review, 75:2, 332-
337; Peter S. Menell, “Intellectual Property: General Theories” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, supra 
note 9, 129-188, at 136. 
48 Shapiro and Varian note in that regard that in network industries, “[t]he key challenge is to obtain critical 
mass – after that, the going gets easier”. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, id. at 14. See also Case IV/M.1069, 
WorldCom/MCI, OJ L 116/1, 4 May 1999, especially at para. 126, where the Commission stated that, “[b]ecause of 
the specific features of network competition and the existence of network externalities which make it valuable for 
customers to have access to the largest network, MCI WorldCom’s position can hardly be challenged once it has 
obtained a dominant position. The more its network grows, the less need it has to interconnect with competitors and 
the more they have to interconnect with the merged entity. Furthermore, the larger its network becomes, the greater 
is its ability to control a significant element of the costs of any new entrant…”.  
49 Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, id. at 177. 
50 Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, id. at 181. See also Massimo Motta, supra note 12, at 82-85. 
51 See supra note 32. See also Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 168. 
52 Victor Stango defines a “lock-in” as “a situation in which economic agents’ equilibrium decisions regarding 
standards adoption yield lower social welfare than an alternative”. See Victor Stango, “The Economics of Standards 
Wars” (2004) Review of Network Economics, 1:1, 1-19, at 4. See also Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, 
at 103-171; Hal R. Varian, “Economics of Information Technology”, Raffaele Mattioli Lectures, 2003, available at 
http://www.Sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.pdf, at 20 et seq. 
53 See Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, 
Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, C(2004) 900 final, confirmed in all essential points by the Court of First 
Instance in Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 17 September 2007 
(nyr). 
54 Victor Stango, supra note 52, at 5. The development of demand for and adoption of new technologies could 
also be influenced by big customers, notably, the government or the military. See e.g. John W. Berresford, “How 
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Another complication of networks and the development of the network markets is that 
the “winner-takes-all” scenario is logically related to a “loser-gets-nothing” situation.55 This 
means that the bigger the network, the stronger the firm, and thus the poorer the chances for the 
survival of other smaller networks or firms.56 This vicious cycle, from the viewpoint of the losers 
(and conversely, a virtuous one from the viewpoint of the winner),57 influences the stimuli for 
innovation and predetermines the adoption of a new technology, service or product. Thus, firms, 
other than the dominant network owner, face extraordinary hurdles to surmount in network 
markets, which could seriously diminish their innovation potential. Firms could arguably 
improve their chances of survival, if their technologies are compatible with those of the larger 
network. This brings us to another issue of paramount importance in network industries in 
relation to innovation, that of standardisation and interoperability (or compatibility).58 In fact, it 
has been proven that the trend towards standardisation59 increases naturally60 in the environment 
of networks. 
1. Standards 
Standards61 are generally perceived as socially beneficial.62 If applied to network markets, 
they allow, most notably, for the creation of networks of networks and make interconnections 
within them smooth. By enhancing interoperability, standards generate greater value for users by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Government Can Bring New Communications to All Americans: Six Lessons of History”, Program on Information 
Resources Policy, Harvard University, October 2004, available at http://www.pirp.harvard.edu, at 2. 
55 See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, at 188. 
56 There are numerous examples in this regard. The most quoted ones are certainly the QWERTY keyboard 
(against the possibly better Dvorak version) and the VHS system (against Sony’s, possibly better, BETA version). A 
more recent example is the victory of Windows Internet Explorer over Netscape. On the browsers war, see Carl 
Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, id. at 289-295. 
57 Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, id. at 176. 
58 On interoperability, see Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, supra note 53, at paras. 30 et seq. 
59 On standardisation in the information economy, see generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, 
at 173-296. For more in-depth analyses, see Stanley Besen & Joseph Farrell, “Choosing How to Compete: Strategies 
and Tactics in Standardization” (1994) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 117-131; Heli Koski & Tobias 
Kretschmer, “Survey on Competing in Network Industries: Firm Strategies, Market Outcomes, and Policy 
Implications” (2004) Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (Bank Papers), 5-31, at 14 et seq.; Victor Stango, 
supra note 52; Knut Blind et al., supra note 34; Knut Blind, The Economics of Standards: Theory, Evidence, Policy, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004; Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, “Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Networks Effects” in Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial 
Organisation, 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland (forthcoming 2008), draft available at http://paulklemperer.org.  
60 Victor Stango, id. at 3. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) being the oldest international 
organisation (created in 1865 under the name International Telegraph Union) is an indirect proof of the necessity for 
standardisation in telecommunications. 
61 In the literature on standardisation, there are different categorisations of standards (see e.g. Knut Blind et al., 
supra note 34, at 185 et seq.). In the context of network industries and innovation, we focus on compatibility and 
interface standards, as opposed to standards in relation to safety, quality or information, since the compatibility 
standards could have their most serious impact on networks. On standards as type of regulation, see Anthony I. 
Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, at 150 et seq. On EC standards, see 
Andreas Neumann, “The European Regulatory Framework for Standardisation in the Telecommunications Sector” 
in Christian Koenig, Andreas Bartosch & Jens-Daniel Braun (eds.), EC Competition and Telecommunications Law, 
The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2002, 617-690, at 617-622. 
62 See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, at 228 et seq. See also Knut Blind et al., supra note 34, at 
xi and 184 et seq.; Andreas Neumann, supra note 61, at 622 et seq. 
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making the network larger.63 Furthermore, standards could substantially reduce uncertainty 
for the consumers, as well for the other market players. Consumers’ lock-in could be decreased 
and “the locus of competition [shifts] from an early battle for dominance to a later battle for 
market share. Instead of competing for the market, companies compete within the market, using 
the common standards”.64 Ultimately, “[a] perfectly compatible system of networks prevents 
static welfare losses which might otherwise arise due to lessened competition and dynamic 
welfare losses which stem from reduced innovative incentives”.65 
Standardisation as a process could be either market or regulation-driven. Under market 
conditions, there are generally a number of different strategies that firms66 undertake in order to 
negotiate a standard or win a “standards war”.67 These involve inter alia important decisions on 
whether firms follow a revolutionary or an evolutionary technological path, whether they open 
their standard or maintain control of the technologies, whether they are diplomatic or aggressive, 
seek an alliance, settle for a truce or fight to the death.68 Every one of these decisions could more 
or less dramatically change the market environment. What is of specific importance in our 
discussion of innovation and regulation is that these “standards wars” might not bring about the 
optimal result in terms of consumer welfare. Due to the specifics of networks, the market might 
settle for a standard that is not necessarily the “best” possible.69 
In such situations, where the market chooses an inefficient standard, or is “locked-in” to an 
old standard, even in the face of a new, superior one,70 there is a clear need for government 
intervention in order to promote standardisation or the migration to a new standard.71 On the 
other hand, it should be noted that setting a standard or assisting the process of achieving one 
through regulatory intervention could equally lead to situations where a “wrong” standard72 is 
                                                 
63 See European Commission, Communication on the role of European standardisation in the framework of 
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64 Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, at 231 (emphasis in the original). See also Carl Shapiro, 
“Competition Policy and Innovation”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper 
DSTI/DOC(2002)11, Paris, 2002, at 25 et seq.  
65 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 173. 
66 Shapiro and Varian identify seven key assets of market players in network markets important in winning a 
standards war. These are: (i) control over an installed base of users; (ii) intellectual property rights; (iii) ability to 
innovate; (iv) first-mover advantages; (v) manufacturing abilities; (vi) strength in complements; and (vii) brand 
name and reputation. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, at 270 et seq.  
67 Hal R. Varian, supra note 52, at 35 et seq. For examples of current standards wars, albeit not in 
telecommunications, see Claude Settele, “Der Krieg der Formate” (The War of the Formats), NZZ Folio, February 
2005, 28 et seq. (especially with regard to digital versatile disc [DVD] formats) and John Palfrey, “Holding Out for 
an Interoperable DRM Standard” in Christoph Beat Graber, Carlo Govoni, Michael Girsberger & Mira Nenova 
(eds.), Digital Rights Management: The End of Collecting Societies?, Berne, Staempfli, 2005, 1-26 (especially with 
regard to digital rights management). For examples of standards wars of the recent past, see Knut Blind et al., supra 
note 34, at 186-199. 
68 See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, supra note 46, at 227-296. 
69 See supra note 56. See also Paul A. David, supra note 47; Stanley J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, 
“Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy” (1994) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8:2, 1-26, at Section V. 
70 See Andreas Neumann, supra note 61, at 623-624. 
71 “[I]t is important to note that regulating interoperability is essential for maintaining effective competition 
whenever there exists market power or a tendency for market dominance. For the markets in which there are no 
distortions due to market dominance or interface control, it might not be necessary to impose interoperability. 
Moreover, such control in these markets might have some important drawbacks in terms of innovation, as the 
operator who wishes to keep exclusive provision of its innovative services might be under an incentive to develop 
innovative and differentiated services”. See Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 174. 
72 See e.g. Paul A. David, supra note 47, at 336. 
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chosen, or the natural market developments are seriously distorted.73 The dangers of hard 
lobbying and regulatory capture are also real and present. In the context of electronic 
communications characterised by extreme dynamism and lack of predictability, making 
technologically biased choices could be particularly harmful to innovation incentives.74 
2. Intellectual Property Rights: Some Brief Remarks 
In talking about innovation and standardisation, we cannot ignore the issue of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), although we shall confine our account to a few brief comments in the 
present context.75 This is due to the particular scope of this article and, by no means, to any lack 
of significance of IPRs to the Information Society.76 
On the contrary, IPRs77 do play a fundamental role with regard to innovation and 
creativity.78 They are meant to be the tool for their protection and promotion, while 
simultaneously balancing other generally recognised interests. “The protection of intellectual 
property should allow the inventor or creator to derive a legitimate profit from his/her invention 
                                                 
73 Massimo Motta, supra note 12, at 484. 
74 Technological neutrality is one of the underlying principles of the 2002 EC e-communications package. See 
Recital 18 and Article 8(1) of the Framework Directive. 
75 Besides the complex relations between innovation, standardisation and IPRs, there are a number of other 
problematic issues related to intellectual property in new technological environments. See e.g. with regard to digital 
rights management and collective rights’ administration, Christoph Beat Graber, Carlo Govoni, Michael Girsberger 
& Mira Nenova, supra note 67. With regard to competition and IPRs, see Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, supra note 
10, at 575-633; Steven D. Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
76 See Carl Shapiro, “Cross Licences, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting” in Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & 
Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001; Paul A. David, 
“Economic Forces in the Coevolution of Information Technology and Intellectual Property Institutions”, Technical 
Report, Stanford University, 2002; Mark R. Patterson, “Innovations, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property” 
(2002) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 17; Mark A. Lemley, “Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations” (2002) California Law Review, 90, 889 et seq.; Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, “Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Information Technology”, UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No 
CPC 04-05, March 2004; Alan Cunningham, “Telecommunications, Intellectual Property, and Standards” in Ian 
Walden & John Angel (eds.), Telecommunications Law and Regulation, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, 341-375. 
77 The general category of IPRs is understood to include the rights granted to creators and inventors to control 
the use made of their products. They are traditionally divided into two main branches: (i) copyright and related (or 
neighbouring) rights for literary and artistic works and (ii) industrial property, which encompasses trademarks, 
patents, industrial designs, geographical indications and layout designs of integrated circuits. For the EC regulation 
in the field, see Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195/16, 2 June 2004; 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167/10, 22 June 2001; Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77/20, 27 March 
1996; Directive 93/98/EEC harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 290/9, 
24 November 1993 and Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122/42, 17 May 
1991. For the IPR-related treaties at the international level, see the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the treaties within the framework of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO): the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property; the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations; the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
78 The US Constitution providing explicitly for copyrights and patents has put this rather poetically: Article I 
§8 states that, “Congress shall have Power […] To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
Limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their Writings and Discoveries”. 
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or creation. It should also allow the widest possible dissemination of works, ideas and new 
knowhow. At the same time, it should not hamper freedom of expression, the free movement of 
information, or the protection of personal data, including on the Internet”.79  
In the field of communications, where, as already stressed, the role of innovation is critical, 
the use of IPRs is intensified. The technological developments of the last couple of decades have 
“multiplied and diversified the vectors for creation, production and exploitation”.80 Digitisation 
and the proliferation of networks, in particular the Internet, have allowed for an unprecedented 
wave of innovation, which has led to calls for the protection of the newly created works. The 
liberalisation of communications markets, which has occurred worldwide over recent decades, 
has led to a multitude of market players and vigorous competition, which have completely 
changed the communications industries’ landscape. These technological and market 
developments have serious implications, inter alia, for standardisation. “Now that 
telecommunication firms are competing nationally and internationally, IP rights are an important 
aspect of their arsenal, and as such now come to impinge on the standard setting process”.81 
Although both IPRs and standards are largely beneficial and have been created to serve the 
public interest, one should acknowledge that they pursue inherently different objectives and may 
thus collide. Standards, as discussed above, are by definition, common, widely recognised and 
used. IPRs, on the other hand, are exclusionary. Indeed, they could be construed as “mini-
monopolies”,82 allowing the owner of the “monopoly” control (albeit limited)83 over the 
intellectual property object. This divergence should be kept in mind when we consider the 
“standards wars” and the “standards negotiations”, discussed in the preceding Section, and their 
substantial impact on innovation. The presence of IPRs adds another level of complexity to these 
processes and allows for strategic games and configurations: “The fact that someone has 
exclusive rights of use concerning that essential technology allows for the potential restriction of 
the standardization process, or the corruption of it, undermining its role for the purpose of private 
pecuniary gain”.84 One should also acknowledge that the use of IPRs as strategic weapons in 
electronic communications is additionally aggravated by the fact that there are huge amounts of 
capital at stake.85 
To conclude this brief discussion of IPRs in the context of innovation as an objective of 
communications regulation, one can propose that there is a potential trade-off between the 
benefits of standardisation and the protection of intellectual property in a dynamic network 
environment. The regulators will clearly have to take these complex relationships into account. 
Answers to the “discussion of whether the existing intellectual property regime functions as 
intended – to stimulate innovation and thus promote long-run competition – or whether the 
system is out of balance, granting excessive intellectual property rights, and could be improved 
so as to avoid retarding innovation and/or harming consumers”86 will have to be sought. In the 
                                                 
79 Directive 2004/48/EC, supra note 77, at Recital 2. See also Peter S. Menell, supra note 47, at 129 et seq. 
80 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 77, at Recital 5. 
81 Alan Cunningham, supra note 76, at 352 (abbreviation in the original). 
82 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, supra note 76, at 6. 
83 The control is limited to a certain period see e.g. with regard to copyright Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 
supra note 77). It is further limited in scope by certain exceptions, e.g. private use (see Directive 2001/29/EC, supra 
note 77, especially Article 5). 
84 Alan Cunningham, supra note 76, at 353. 
85 For examples of the use of IPRs as strategic weapons, see Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, supra note 37; 
Alan Cunningham, supra note 76, at 358 et seq. 
86 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, id. at 5. 
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network environment of electronic communications, the threshold for intellectual property 
protection might need to be higher than in traditional markets in order to foster the adoption of 
standardised interfaces and the realisation of network externalities.87 On the other hand, 
intellectual property protection may be required in network markets in order to provide adequate 
rewards for firms pursuing research and development of better standards, rather than settling for 
the current ones.88 
3. Facility-based Or Service-based Competition? 
Another choice that has to be made in the framework of electronic communications of 
significance for defining the path of innovation, is between innovation for new services and 
innovation for new (alternative) infrastructure.89 From a regulatory perspective, especially in the 
context of liberalisation, it was particularly important to determine which of these alternatives 
(services or infrastructure) would receive a regulatory impetus and which would be pursued as 
the ultimate goal.90 
Facility-based competition or competition between networks91 involves the building of 
alternative infrastructure or duplication of the infrastructure of the existing operator. This type of 
competition is perceived as contributing to long-term efficiency and spurring investment and 
innovation.92 Consumers are not bound by the local network owned by a single operator, but 
have a choice not only of services but also of network provision. “The benefits from flexibility 
and innovation obtainable under this state of affairs exceed by far those achievable under 
facility-sharing settlements”.93 These benefits94 are, however, only one side of the coin: building 
                                                 
87 Peter S. Menell, supra note 47, at 142, referring to Peter S. Menell, “Tailoring Legal Protection for 
Computer Software” (1987) Stanford Law Review, 39, 1329-1372. 
88 Id. 
89 The dilemma between facility-based and service-based competition is a complex one. For a comprehensive 
examination of the pertinent issues, see Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, supra note 37; Jean-Jacques Laffont & 
Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications: Munich Lectures in Economics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000, at 207-215; Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Treece, “Innovation, Investment, and 
Unbundling” (2000) Yale Journal on Regulation, 17:1, 1-37; Mats A. Bergman, “Competition in Services or 
Infrastructure-based Competition?” in Swedish Post and Telecom Agency, An Anthology of the Foundations for 
Competition and Development in Electronic Communications Markets, Stockholm: PTS, 2004, 6-55; Marc 
Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, “Service-based vs. Facility-based Competition in Local Access Networks” (2004) 
Information Economics and Policy, 16:2, 287-306; Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, “Unbundling the Local Loop” 
(2005) European Economic Review, 49:1, 173-199; Paul de Bijl & Martin Petz, Regulation and Entry into 
Telecommunications Markets, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, especially at 87 et seq. 
90 See e.g. European Commission, Green Paper on the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment: Towards a dynamic European economy, COM(1987) 290 final, 30 
June 1987. 
91 Kiessling and Blondeel make an additional differentiation between inter-modal and intra-modal facility 
competition. The former refers to competition between different transmission media (e.g. copper and fibre), while 
the latter describes competition between facility-based operators using the same transmission medium. See Thomas 
Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, supra note 37, at 4. 
92 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 178. On the implications of innovation policy for the third-
generation Internet, see further François Bar, Stephen Cohen, Peter Cowhey, Brad DeLong, Michael Kleeman & 
John Zysman, “Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-Generation Internet” (2000) Telecommunications Policy, 
4, 489-518. 
93 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, id. at 178. The Commission has confirmed this position in a recent 
Communication, stating that, “[i]n the mid to long-term [facility-based competition] is the best way to low prices 
and increased choice of services. It also stimulates innovation and creates resilience in communications 
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new networks is an extremely costly and sometimes a risky undertaking. Firms face 
enormous sunk costs and have to confront (in most cases) the competition of the incumbent, who 
already has an installed base. Furthermore, building new facilities may be construed as a 
“wasteful duplication”95 of infrastructure. 
Service-based competition, on the other hand, takes place, as the name indicates, only with 
regard to the services or service-packages, offered over the already existing networks. In order to 
provide these, operators need to have access96 to the network of the incumbent. In essence, the 
new market players buy and resell incumbents’ services, trying to make profits by offering 
discounts on the incumbent’s retail tariffs and to attract customers by superior efficiency in 
marketing or billing.97 The entrants are, however, not free to launch new services, unless in 
collaboration with the incumbent, since the incumbent controls the network. 
A prominent example of policing service-based competition is the opening of the local loop. 
The “local loop”, also known as the “last mile”, signifies the connection, the last wires laid 
between the customer and local area exchange of the operator’s network.98 These local networks 
constitute bottlenecks in themselves and are particularly uneconomical to duplicate.99 If firms 
were to build an alternative access network, this would require large traffic volumes to make up 
for the investment costs, which in residential networks might be non-existent.100 On the other 
                                                                                                                                                             
infrastructure as a whole”. See European Commission, Electronic communications: The road to the knowledge 
economy, COM(2003) 65 final, 11 February 2003, at 4.  
94 For an account of the benefits associated with facility-based competition, see Thomas Kiessling & Yves 
Blondeel, supra note 37, at 4 et seq. For an example from Switzerland, see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Aufbau bei 
Cablecom, Abbau bei Swisscom“, 17/18 September 2005. 
95 Mats A. Bergman, supra note 89. 
96 The current EC Access Directive defines access as “the making available of facilities and/or services, to 
another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of 
providing electronic communications services. It covers inter alia: access to network elements and associated 
facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this includes 
access to the local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide services over the local loop), access to 
physical infrastructure including buildings, ducts and masts; access to relevant software systems including 
operational support systems, access to number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality, access to 
fixed and mobile networks, in particular for roaming, access to conditional access systems for digital television 
services; access to virtual network services”. See Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, OJ L 108/7, 24 April 2002 (hereinafter the Access 
Directive), at Article 2(a). See also Rohan Kariyawasam, “Interconnection, Access and Peering: Law and Precedent” 
in Ian Walden & John Angel (eds.), Telecommunications Law, London: Blackstone, 2001, 136-223; Paul Nihoul & 
Peter Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, at paras. 3.01 et seq.  
97 Kostis Christodoulou & Kiriakos Vlahos, “Implications of Regulation for Entry and Investment in the Local 
Loop” (2001) Telecommunications Policy, 25, 743-757, at 745. 
98 “Local loop means the physical circuit connecting the network termination point at the subscriber’s premises 
to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility in the fixed public telephone network”. See Article 2(c) of the 
Access Directive. See also Recital 3 and Article 2(c) of Regulation 2887/2000/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L 336/4, 30 December 2000. 
99 The Regulation on unbundling the local loop points out in this regard that, “[i]t would not be economically 
viable for new entrants to duplicate the incumbent’s metallic local access infrastructure in its entirety within a 
reasonable time. Alternative infrastructures such as cable television, satellite, wireless local loops do not generally 
offer the same functionality or ubiquity for the time being, though situations in Member States may differ”. Id. at 
Recital 6. See also European Commission, Unbundled access to the local loop: Enabling the competitive provision 
of a full range of electronic communications services, including broadband multimedia and high-speed Internet, OJ 
C 272/55, 23 September 2000. 
100 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 1.134.  
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hand, these last metres of wire are crucial for reaching the end-consumers of any 
communications services. 
During the process of opening telecommunications markets, it was acknowledged that to 
promote competition in these local markets, an additional regulatory intervention was needed. 
Access to such networks was policed through the exercise of “unbundling”. This is a regulatory 
approach that, in the EC context, means providing mandatory access to the metallic local loops 
of notified operators designated as having significant market power in the fixed public telephone 
network supply market.101 As such, unbundling facilitates entry into the market as firms may join 
without having to incur the high sunk and fixed costs of providing their own networks. This 
increases the number of market players and the choice of services, allowing operators to build 
customer base and brand recognition.102 Under benevolent supply conditions, the actors are then 
stimulated to invest in alternative network structures in the long term and move up the 
“investment ladder”.103 However, it should be noted that by making entry too “easy”, unbundling 
might also undermine some incentives for building alternative networks.104 Furthermore, the 
climbing of the “investment ladder” is not in itself an exercise, which should be taken for granted 
– stepping on to the ladder does not mean that one will automatically reach its top.105 
In terms of innovation, unbundling as a service-based promoter is beneficial and stimulating 
for new entrants in the short and mid-term, although its actual application in terms of pricing and 
timing is controversial.106 With regard to long-term competition, however, the incentives for 
                                                 
101 See Regulation 2887/2000/EC, supra note 98. For an excellent overview of the problems related to the 
unbundling the local loop, see OECD Working Party on Telecommunications and Information Services Policies, 
“Developments in Local Loop Unbundling”, DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)5/final, 10 September 2003. See also Jerry A. 
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, “A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of 
Telecommunications Networks” (1999) The Yale Law Journal, 109, 417-505; Chris Doyle, “Local Loop 
Unbundling and Regulatory Risk” (2000) Journal of Network Industries, 1, 33-54; Juan Delgado, Jérôme 
Fehrenbach & Robert Klotz, “The Price of Access: Unbundling the Local Loop in the EU” in Pierre A. Buigues & 
Patrick Rey (eds.), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2004, 169-182; Paul W.J. de Bijl & Martin Peitz, “Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and 
Policy Challenges” (2005) Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) Discussion Paper, DP 2005-008. 
102 Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, supra note 37, at 8, referring also to T. Randolph Beard, David L. 
Kaserman & John W. Mayo, “The Role of Resale Entry in Promoting Local Exchange Competition” (1998) 
Telecommunications Policy, 22:4/5, at 316-318. For an economic analysis, see Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. 
Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, “Do Unbundling Policies Discourage Competitive Local Exchange Carriers’ Facilities-
Based Investment” (2004) Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 14:14, Article 14. 
103 The Tenth Communications Report registers precisely such a development from services to facility-based 
competition. The Report formulates the “investment ladder” as “a situation where a new entrant/alternative operator 
benefits initially from access products at different levels of the value chain in order to build customer base, and then 
progressively rolls out its own infrastructure towards the customer”. See European Commission, European 
electronic communications regulation and markets 2004, COM(2004) 759 final, 2 December 2004, Vol. I, at 46, 
footnote 22. 
104 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 178. See also Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, supra 
note 37, at 10 et seq.  
105 For a critical view of the investment ladder developments, see Alison Oldale & Atilano Jorge Padilla, 
“From State Monopoly to the ‘Investment Ladder’: Competition Policy and the NRF” in Mats A. Bergman & Arvid 
Nilsson (eds.), The Pros and Cons of Antitrust in Deregulated Markets, Stockholm: Swedish Competition Authority, 
2004, at 51-77. See also Günter Knieps, “Europäischer Regulierungseifer in der Telekommunikation“, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 16 February 2006. 
106 See Chris Doyle, “Local Loop Unbundling and Regulatory Risk” (2000) Journal of Network Industries, 1, 
33-54, especially at 48 et seq.; Kostis Christodoulou & Kiriakos Vlahos, supra note 97, at 745 et seq.; Jean-Jacques 
Laffont & Jean Tirole, supra note 89, at 207-215; Juan Delgado, Jérôme Fehrenbach & Robert Klotz, supra note 
101. 
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innovation may well be diminished.107 The incentives for the incumbent will be determined 
by the pre- and post-entry regulation.108 Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that, “to the 
extent that service-based and facility-based entry are perceived as substitute strategies by the 
entrants, regulatory policies that are aimed at each one of them may exhibit conflicts”.109 
D. Interim Conclusion on the Economic Goals 
In drawing a conclusion on the economic goals of communications regulation at this 
preliminary level of the discussion, one could propose that the intermediate objective of 
economic regulation is the creation of “…conditions for competition to exist and policing it to 
continue to exist”.110 The latter leads to the achievement of the ultimate goal, which is consumer 
welfare and maximisation of wealth at the lowest possible cost for society.  
In the environment of electronic communications with pronounced network effects, to 
achieve welfare (particularly in the long term) also means that the regulatory tools would have 
the capability to address the dynamic aspects of competition, i.e. innovation. In the words of 
Bourreau and Doğan, “[t]o the extent that technological changes alter the organization of the 
industry, speed of innovation – particularly in new markets – should be reflected in any 
regulatory intervention. If regulatory authorities cannot respond fast enough to follow the rapid 
change of the market, many regulatory measures then become either inefficient or obsolete”.111 
As the examination of some issues relevant to innovation showed, innumerable factors come 
into play in the pursuit of this dynamic aspect of competition. The relationship between these 
factors is however equivocal and offers no clear answers as to what is right or wrong, although a 
tendency towards a facility-based approach is discernible. It is furthermore of primary 
importance to acknowledge that these economic objectives do not exist in isolation, but rather 
exist simultaneously in the system of electronic communications. Due to the network 
externalities and other specificities of the communications environment, any regulatory decision 
taken would have repercussions in various directions and these need to be interpreted with 
caution. 
Following this line of reasoning, one could propose that the real goal of regulation is to 
achieve a balance within the system. This will involve, among others, choices between static and 
dynamic efficiencies, strict economic and internal market rationales, market-driven and 
regulation-supervised (or assisted) standardisation, intellectual property protection and openness, 
infrastructure-based and service-based competition. The delicate balancing act between these 
options, and not only the movements of the “invisible hand”,112 will then ultimately bring the 
welfare aspired to. 
                                                 
107 When “…the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops; […] the entrant adopts the new technology 
too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption 
but also on the type (quality) of the new technology to be adopted”. See Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan (2005), 
supra note 89, at 173. See also Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan (2004), id. at 288 et seq. 
108 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 182. 
109 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan (2004), supra note 89, at 287. 
110 Tony Prosser, Law and the Regulators, Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, at 5. 
111 Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 169. 
112 Referring again to Adam Smith, supra note 9. 
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III. SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES 
The distinction between economic and social objectives is in many respects only nominal 
since the economy is an inseparable part of the overall structure of society. It thus has a direct 
influence on all other societal systems. Following this line of reasoning, the economic objectives 
outlined in the first part of the article, have a clear social dimension because they seek an 
increase in welfare through allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, deterring undesirable 
distribution of wealth and opportunity, and since the ultimate beneficiaries of the market 
outcomes are the members of society.113 
Yet, there are goals beyond those that may or may not be met without additional regulatory 
intervention. These wider policy goals are aimed more directly at serving the public interest and 
may be economic in nature (such as the equitable distribution of resources) or less tangible 
(relating to education, culture, pluralism and democracy) and stemming from the fundamental 
rights as safeguarded in all constitutional models. For the purpose of this article, such goals will 
be referred to as societal.114 Meeting them may involve, most notably, a departure from optimal 
economic outcomes and ancillary regulatory intervention, implying certain network regulatory 
costs. It should, however, be stressed that the accomplishment of the economic goals is often an 
essential prerequisite for the pursuit of those beyond. 
Without any claims of being exhaustive, the following sections attempt to delineate a few of 
the societal objectives that are of primary significance in electronic communications and that 
should be taken into account when designing a model of regulation. In contrast to the previous 
Sections on the economic goals of regulation, which are generally valid for the majority of the 
sectors of the economy (or at least for those that are network-bound), the next sections on the 
societal goals will be sector-specific and focus exclusively on the communications environment. 
This change of approach is needed since the communications sector, “unlike car industry or 
wheat markets”,115 has an additional special role within society as a platform of communication 
and distribution of information. 
A. Universal Service 
When talking about societal goals, the first one that comes to mind in the specific context of 
telecommunications is universal service. We shall briefly look into the institution of universal 
service as an interesting example revealing the dynamics of the goals pursued and the politics 
behind their formulation.116 
                                                 
113 Although US antitrust is typically used as an example of pursuing pure economic efficiency, the US 
Supreme Court stated in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan that, “[t]he purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect 
businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs 
itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest”. See 
Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 US 447 (1993), at 458 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
114 “Of or relating to the structure, organization, or functioning of society”, as defined by the American 
Heritage Dictionary, 4th ed., Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. 
115 A contrast used by Mark Naftel & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Telecoms Trade War: The United States, the 
European Union and the World Trade Organization, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2000, at 2. 
116 For a detailed analysis of universal service in the European context and a comprehensive comparison 
between the old and the new regimes, see Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at paras. 5.01-5.350. On the 
economic rationales behind universal service, see Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, supra note 89, at 217-264. 
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1. The Roots of Universal Service Policies 
The concept and practice of universal service have their roots in certain “notorious” 
developments in the US at the dawn of the 20th century.117 As the legend goes, it was Theodore 
Vail, the then Chairman of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), who 
convinced the government that a regulated monopoly with a universal service obligation was a 
better model to adopt than a system of traffic interexchange among competing networks.118 
Theodore Vail called for the creation of a single, common, uniform, nationwide, 
telecommunications network whose services would ultimately be available to all users at all 
locations.119 The subsequent adoption of the Willis-Graham Act in 1921 marked the end of the 
competitive era in US telecom markets and by exempting telephone companies from the 
Sherman Act, opened the way to monopoly, which was supposed to cater for universal service 
provision. The 1934 Communications Act affirmed the subsidised universal penetration model. 
Although it made no explicit reference to universal service, it charged the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) with the task of giving all US citizens a national and global 
telecommunications service, provided by AT&T at an affordable price.120 
In the EC, as a supranational entity, the conceptualisation of universal service and the need 
to formulate a comprehensive policy in that respect came understandably much later than in the 
US, with the liberalisation endeavours in the telecom sector. Until then, in the existing landscape 
of strictly national monopolies, there was no necessity for such a policy at the European level. 
Universal service obligations (USOs) did exist but they were considered a national matter of the 
Member States. The pre-liberalisation Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) monopoly model 
had as one of its core objectives, and indeed as its justification, the provision of universal service 
as part of the public service.121 It was widely assumed at the time that state ownership was 
sufficient to secure PTT action in the public interest. “[T]he state was seen as a ‘stopgap’ for 
tasks that the private sector could not provide”122 and the PTTs were viewed accordingly “as 
                                                 
117 A particularly good reference on the development of the US telephone system and universal service is 
Milton L. Mueller, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of the American 
Telephone System, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. See also Milton L. Mueller, “Universal Service in Telephone 
History: A Reconstruction” (1993) Telecommunications Policy, 17:5, 352-369. 
118 These networks were locally developed by some 6 000 independents across the US after the expiry of 
AT&T’s phone patents. The local networks varied in standards and quality and were (willingly or not) usually 
incompatible with one another. 
119 The campaign launched by Theodore Vail was under the slogan “One Policy, One System, Universal 
Service”. The original document is available at http://www.att.com/history/milestone_1908.html. 
120 “For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to 
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges…”. See Communications Act of 1934, Section 1, 47 USC. 
151, amended version available at http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf. 
121 Public service is a term usually used to mean services provided by a government to its citizens, either 
directly (through the public sector) or by financing private provision of services. The term is widely associated with 
the common consensus that certain services should be available to all, regardless of income. On public service, see 
Antonio Bavasso, Communications in EU Antitrust Law, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 
2003, at 354 et seq.; Tony Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, at 96-173. 
122 Johannes M. Bauer, “Universal Service in the European Union” (1999) Government Information Quarterly, 
16:4, 329-343, at 332. 
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instruments of government policy contributing to macroeconomic and microeconomic policy 
goals, including the provision of universal service”.123  
In reality, most PTTs never came remotely close to providing universal service in the sense 
of access to the public telephone network to all at all locations. The levels of economic 
efficiency of the PTTs and their responsiveness to customer needs were poor, and in almost all 
respects, the “idealistic theory of public service failed dramatically in practice”.124 Similarly, 
even in the US, although the AT&T, provided through cross-subsidisation between long-distance 
and local call traffic, local telephony below cost, it did not achieve universal geographical roll-
out of its services. In fact, it took until the 1960s for appropriate levels of penetration to be 
reached due mostly to a reduction in connection costs faced by service providers and a vigorous 
market demand.125 
2. Universal Service in a Post-Liberalisation Era 
As mentioned earlier, the EC did not have a clear-cut universal service policy since the 
provision of the so-called public services was deemed a national matter until the beginning of the 
opening of telecommunications to competition. With the formulation of European 
telecommunications policy, however, which commenced symbolically with the Green Paper on 
the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment126 in 
1987, the idea of providing certain “basic services” was taken into consideration.127 Within the 
Open Network Provision (ONP) model, which provided for asymmetrical sectoral rules that 
assisted the liberalisation of EC telecommunications,128 universal service was for the first time 
regulated at the Community level. It was founded on three major principles, namely:  
1) Continuity, i.e. a specified quality must be offered all the time,  
2) Equality, i.e. access must be offered independently of location, and  
3) Affordability, i.e. a certain price level for basic services, affordable for all, must be 
assured. 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 William H. Melody, supra note 6, at 14. 
125 See Paschal Preston & Roderick Flynn, “Rethinking Universal Service: Citizenship, Consumption Norms 
and the Telephone” (2000) The Information Society, 16, 91-98, at 92-93, as referred to by Seamus Simpson, 
“Universal Service Issues in Converging Communications Environments: The Case of the UK” (2004) 
Telecommunications Policy, 28, 233-248, at 235. See also Nicholas Garnham, “Universal Service” in William. H. 
Melody (ed.), Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, Lyngby: Technical University of 
Denmark, 1997, 199-204, at 200. 
126 European Commission, Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications 
services and equipment, supra note 90. 
127 Id. at 42. The document did not mention universal service as such but discussed the possibility of 
maintaining exclusive or special rights with respect to the provider of a limited number of basic services. It built on 
previous discussions: see European Commission, Communication on the consultation on the review of the situation 
in the telecommunications services sector, COM(1993) 159 final, 26 April 1993; European Commission, 
Developing universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, COM(1993) 543, 15 November 
1993. 
128 On the ONP framework, see Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European 
Telecommunications, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2000, at 25-32. 
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Following these principles, Directive 97/33/EC129 and Directive 98/10/EC,130 identified 
“universal service” as “a defined minimum set of services of specified quality which is available 
to all users independent of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national 
conditions, at an affordable price”.131 This “minimum set of services” included at that time: 
(i) access to the fixed public telephone network at a fixed location; (ii) access to fixed public 
telephone services enabling users to make and receive national and international calls, supporting 
speech, facsimile and/or data communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay phones; 
and (v) certain measures for disabled users and users with special social needs.132 
The 2002 EC universal service regime133 includes in the USOs: (i) access location to the 
public telephone network; (ii) access to publicly available telephone services at a fixed location 
enabling end-users to make and receive local, national and international telephone calls, 
facsimile and data communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay telephones; and 
(v) certain specific measures for disabled users, those with low income or special social needs. 
If one compares the above two definitions, it is striking how little has changed.134 The 
parameters of the USOs are practically the same and a legitimate question that arises, is: what 
has changed since the liberalisation? Has the introduction of competition changed anything? 
We argue that, although seemingly little has been altered, a few key “ingredients” of the 
overall universal service policy certainly have: firstly, it appears that there is a new case for 
universal service. While, during the liberalisation period, some of the rationales for universal 
service provision were incited by the politics of transformation, rather than based on purely 
economic and social grounds (or to put it radically, in the words of Nicholas Garnham, the idea 
of universal access was “mobilised as an attempted defence of the telephone monopoly”135), in a 
post-liberalisation environment characterised by technological dynamism and a wide variety of 
services, the idea of access takes on new dimensions. The existing network effects, the possible 
                                                 
129 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the 
principles of the Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ L 199/32, 26 July 1997 (hereinafter Directive 97/33/EC). 
130 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the application 
of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a 
competitive environment, OJ L 101/24, 1 April 1998 (hereinafter Directive 98/10/EC). Both Directive 97/33/EC and 
Directive 98/10/EC were based to a large extent on the concepts laid down by the Commission Directive 96/19/EC 
on full competition (OJ L 74/13, 22 March 1996), which amended and added Article 4(c) to Commission Directive 
90/388 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 192/10, 24 July 1990. 
131 Article 2(1)(g) of Directive 97/33/EC and 2(2)(f) of Directive 98/10/EC. 
132 Articles 5-8 of Directive 98/10/EC. See also Annex I of Directive 97/33/EC. 
133 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108/51, 24 April 2002 
(hereinafter the Universal Service Directive). See in particular Articles 4-9. 
134 If one carefully compares the two definitions, the only difference is the deletion of “fixed” under point (i). 
There were no changes in practical terms either. See European Policy Committee, Annual Report on Structural 
Reforms 2002, ECFIN/EPC/117/02-EN, Brussels, 5 March 2002, at 17. 
135 Nicholas Garnham, supra note 125, at 200. See also Thomas Hart, “A Dynamic Universal Service for a 
Heterogeneous European Union” (1998) Telecommunications Policy, 22:10, 839-852, at 840; Jean-Jacques Laffont 
& Jean Tirole, supra note 89, at 218. The “universal service” argumentation is still used as a defence for State 
control in some countries even after the liberalisation of communications markets. The developments in Switzerland 
at the end of 2005 are a good illustration in this context. See e.g. Christian Levrat, “Der Bund ist der richtige 
Swisscom-Aktionär“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 December 2005 and Botschaft zur Bundesbeteiligung am 
Unternehmen Swisscom AG vom 5. April 2006, BBl 2006 3763 (Message of the Federal Council on the Federal 
Participation in the Swisscom Corporation), at 3770. 
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use of communications services as a substitute for other services (e.g. transport) and the 
increasing value placed on communications in the Information Society – as providing access to 
other goods and services, including public ones – are some of the reasons for making a new case 
for universal service.136 
Secondly, in the new context of competitive communications, there are new tools for the 
provision of USOs. There is, above all, an emphasis on the role of the market in the achievement 
of the defined USOs. This priority role of the market takes different dimensions. In the EC 
context, for instance, Member States are obliged to “…determine the most efficient and 
appropriate approach for ensuring the implementation of universal service, whilst respecting the 
principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality”137 and to seek a 
minimisation of market distortions.138 As a consequence of the above, no market player is a 
priori excluded from designation for provision of USOs139 and all undertakings present on the 
communications markets are eligible under an efficient, objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory designation mechanism.140 Furthermore, appointed operators must not necessarily 
be nationals of the Member State and undertakings from other geographical markets (e.g. US or 
Swiss companies) or other sectors (e.g. from the electricity industry141) could enter the 
designation procedures.  
A third element added to the post-liberalisation universal regime that is linked to the above, 
but may be also considered separately, is its built-in flexibility. For instance, EC Member States 
may now designate more than one undertaking, or designate different undertakings or sets of 
undertakings to provide different elements of the universal service and/or to cover different parts 
of the national territory.142 This fragmentation of the mandate allows for competition between 
undertakings in the provision of universal service and greater efficiency. In view of the inherent 
dynamism of communications, the flexibility of the new regime is further ensured by the 
periodic review of the scope of USOs.143 The review is to be undertaken “in the light of social, 
economic and technological developments, taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data 
rates in the light of the prevailing technologies used by the majority of subscribers”.144 The 
review process could thus, taking account of new developments in society, in terms of the need 
                                                 
136 See Nicholas Garnham, id. at 201. 
137 Article 3(2) of the Universal Service Directive. 
138 Id. and Article 6 of Consolidated Competition Directive (supra note 1). 
139 Contrary to the previous regime. See Article 4(c)(1) of Commission Directive 90/388 on competition in the 
markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 192/10, 24 July 1990, introduced by the amendment by Commission 
Directive 96/19/EC on full competition (supra note 130). See also Article 5(1) of Directive 97/33/EC and European 
Commission, Statement to the Minutes of the 1910th Meeting of the Council (Telecommunications) on 27 March 
1996 on who contributes to universal service, attached to Communication on the Assessment Criteria for National 
Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member 
States on Operation and Such Schemes, COM(1996) 608 final, 27 November 1996, at Annex C. 
140 Article 8(2) of the Universal Service Directive. 
141 See European Commission, “High-speed Internet Access via the Electricity Grid: Commission Seeks to 
Create New Market Opportunities”, IP/05/403, Brussels, 8 April 2005. See also Draft Commission Recommendation 
of 6 April 2005 on broadband electronic communications through powerlines, C(2005) 1031, 6 April 2005. 
142 Article 8(1) of the Universal Service Directive. 
143 See Article 15(1) of the Universal Service Directive. 
144 Article 15(2) of the Universal Service Directive. See also Annex V thereof. 
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for and spread of technologies, and the new developments in technology, adjust the 
parameters of universal service at the EC level.145 
3. Interim Conclusion on Universal Service 
The insertion of the services, outlined in the above Section, as part of the current USOs is 
warranted by the importance of communication, inclusion and cohesion in a contemporary 
society. In that sense, the provision of communications services is “extended not just to the limit 
of economic efficiency, but to the limit of social need”,146 even if satisfying the latter deviates 
from the strict economic raison d’être. As stated by the First EC Communication on Services of 
General Interest, “[t]he real challenge is to ensure a smooth interplay between, on the one hand, 
the requirements of the single market and free competition in terms of free movement, economic 
performance and dynamism and, on the other, the general interest objectives”.147 In facing this 
challenge, the new universal service regime departs from the broad concept of public service (as 
something essentially provided by the State148) and moves towards a flexible USOs system 
where the market delivers most of the benefits with some additional regulatory corrections 
made.149 
One should not however equate the universal service regimes (previous, current or future) to 
the societal goals behind USOs.150 “It is important to understand […] history and how, different 
stages of development of telecommunications networks, universal service will have different 
meaning and emphases”.151 Upon closer examination of these different stages,152 one could see 
                                                 
145 In accordance with its obligation under Article 15 of the Universal Service Directive and in the framework 
of the 2007 regulatory reform of the electronic communications package, the Commission put forward a proposal for 
new Universal Service Directive. While the scope of USO remains basically unchanged, the proposed amendments 
encompass: improving the transparency for end-users; facilitating use of and access to e-communications for 
disabled users; strengthened provisions on number portability; improving obligations related to emergency services; 
and ensuring basic connectivity and quality of service. See European Commission, On the review of the scope of 
universal service and European Commission, Report regarding the outcome of the Review of the scope of universal 
service in accordance with Article 15(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC, COM(2006) 163 final, 7 April 2006 and 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, COM(2007) 698 
final, 13 November 2007. See also European Commission, On the review of the EU regulatory framework for 
electronic communications and services, COM(2006) 334 final, 28 June 2006 and European Commission, Report on 
the outcome of the Review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC and Summary of the 2007 Reform Proposals, COM(2007) 696 final, 13 
November 2007. 
146 William H. Melody, supra note 6, at 13. 
147 European Commission, Services of general interest in Europe, OJ C 281/3, 26 September 1996, at para. 19. 
148 See supra note 121. 
149 “The public service mission has not changed but it is not the undertakings with special or exclusive rights 
who are responsible for its execution. It is rather the market now who is to deliver most of the benefits with certain 
additional regulatory corrections made”. See Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 5.05. For a 
comparison between public service and universal service, see id. at paras. 5.318-5.324. 
150 See e.g. Milton L. Mueller, “Universal Service Policies as Wealth Distribution” (1999) Government 
Information Quarterly, 16:4, 353-358 and Nicholas Garnham, supra note 125, 199-204. 
151 Colin R. Blackman, “Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?” (1995) Telecommunications Policy, 
19:3, 171-176, at 172. 
152 Claire Milne, “Stages of Universal Service Policy” (1998) Telecommunications Policy, 22:9, 775-780, at 
776. 
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that, although the meaning of universal service and how it is pursued vary widely, there is 
“an underlying unity of aim”.153 Equity, continuity and affordability as values innate to 
citizenship154 remain as its intact objectives (albeit pursued with different stress and intensity). 
Thus, one could conclude that universal service is a tool for the achievement of other 
societal goals. It is also a dynamic concept, “[b]y its nature […] prone to evolution”,155 and could 
accommodate, depending on the political environment, different concrete objectives.156 Although 
until now, universal service has coincided in practice with plain old telephone service (POTS), 
we should think of it instead as an “empty” concept based on the principles of continuity, equity 
and affordability that may be filled in the future with additional content.157 Following this line of 
reasoning, universal service could then be stretched to include broadband or other Internet 
applications (especially in view of the enhanced Information Society policies) or assigned 
entirely different task(s) related to access to information rather than simply dealing with 
conventional access to networks.158 USOs could further be seen as a driver of innovation,159 
taking into consideration the aforementioned importance of innovation in itself and the 
specificities of communications as a network industry.160 As such, universal service could 
“stimulate the creation of a broad-based society of lay users for advanced ICT [Information and 
Communication Technologies], whose participation in successful interaction with suppliers is 
key to the breadth of the ICT innovation process […] increas[ing] the total range and number of 
information technology innovations and at the same decreas[ing] the proportion of 
‘unsatisfactory innovations’”.161 
 
                                                 
153 Claire Milne, id. at 777. Claire Milne identifies the following common elements: (i) universal service is 
desired for social or political reasons and includes a notion of “equity”; (ii) achievement of universal service is 
apparently not commercially viable; (iii) it is recognised that definitions will change as society and technology 
change; (iv) definitions cover what are seen as “basic telecoms services” i.e. well established, relatively cheap, and 
very important to ordinary people; (v) adequate quality of service is defined or understood; (vi) service must be 
affordable by those for whom it is designed. 
154 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 5.319. See also Giuliano Amato, “Citizenship and 
Public Services: Some General Reflections” in Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra (eds.), Public Services and 
Citizenship in European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 145 et seq. 
155 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, id. at para. 5.78. 
156 For a critique of the possibility for pursuit of other political objectives, see e.g. Milton L. Mueller, supra 
note 150; Nicholas Garnham, supra note 125, 199-204. 
157 See e.g. The Economist, “Hearing Voices”, 28 October 2004. 
158 Robin Mansell remarks in that regard: “There is a shift away from policy discussions about the access to 
networks towards debates about the availability and affordability of information applications. A distinction between 
“basic” access to networks at reasonable prices and “basic” access to information is needed. The issue is whether 
network operators and service suppliers who control the gateways for accessing customers should be permitted to 
screen out certain kinds of information that may be regarded by public policy as essential to the conduct of business 
and everyday life. Decisions are needed on whether provisions need to be made to ensure access to certain kinds of 
public information (e.g. health, education, transport, government information) and whether the governments of 
member states or the European Union should underwrite the costs of ensuring that this information is accessible”. 
See Robin Mansell, “Designing Networks to Capture Customers: Policy and Regulation Issues for the New Telecom 
Environment” in William. H. Melody (ed.), Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, Lyngby: 
Technical University of Denmark, 1997, 77-90, at 85-86. 
159 François Bar & Annemarie Munk Riis, “From Welfare to Innovation: Toward a New Rationale for 
Universal Service”, Conference Paper presented at the 26th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Alexandria, VA, 3-5 October 1998. 
160 See supra Section 1.3. 
161 François Bar & Annemarie Munk Riis, supra note 159, at 17. 
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B. Consumer protection 
Consumer protection is another societal objective that one could clearly identify, both as a 
general concept valid for all economic sectors and as having a communications-specific 
meaning. Consumer protection is in fact a notion that covers a wide variety of policies ranging 
from very precise and exhaustive rules (e.g. contract conditions, labelling requirements, etc.) to 
more general ones (e.g. universal service policy). If we construe consumer protection in its 
broadest sense, all of the objectives outlined in the preceding Sections, namely competition in its 
static and dynamic aspects, universal service and all the policy choices made for their 
achievement – regarding liberalisation, innovation, standardisation or definition of USOs – 
should lead to protection of the consumers. Indeed consumers are intended to be the ultimate 
beneficiaries, both individually and collectively, as members of the socium. 
As mentioned above, the achievement of the economic goals is often an essential basis for 
the pursuit of “other” goals. This, however, does not imply a primacy of the economic goals over 
the societal (non-economic) ones. The latter must be guaranteed in parallel, constantly and 
without compromise. The roots of the principle of consumer protection may be traced back to the 
constitutional human rights, in the sense of the right to the integrity of the person,162 the right to 
liberty and security,163 the right to property,164 right to protection of personal data,165 and to non-
discrimination,166 among others.167 
Transparency, objectivity, proportionality and non-discrimination are additional general 
principles that permeate legal regimes and are equally valid for the regulatory framework for 
electronic communications, both for the service providers and the regulating agencies.168 
Timeliness and impartiality are further norms for the actions of the regulatory authorities.169 So 
                                                 
162 European Convention on Human Rights, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 
364/1, 18 December 2000, at Article 3.  
163 Id. at Article 6. 
164 Id. at Article 17. 
165 Id. at Article 8. 
166 Id. at Article 21. The above rights have their counterparts in the European Convention for Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 
November 1950, as amended by Protocol No 11, ETS No 155) and build upon the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (GA Resolution 217 A (iii), UN Doc. A/810, 10 December 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (GA Resolution 2200 A (xxi), UN Doc. A/6316, 1966), entered into force 23 March 1976 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (GA Resolution 2200 A (xi), UN Doc. A/6316, 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). 
167 The 2002 Data Protection Directive, for instance, states its aim explicitly as “to respect the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of fundamental rights of the European 
Union. In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for the rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of that 
Charter”. See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, OJ L 201/37, 31 
July 2002 (hereinafter Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), at Recital 2. For the 2007 review of 
the Directive, see European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, 
COM(2007) 698 final, 13 November 2007. 
168 See e.g. Recital 19, 20, 22, Articles 3 and 9(1) of the Framework Directive, Recitals 30, 31, Articles 14, 21 
of the Universal Service Directive. 
169 Article 3(3) of the Framework Directive e.g. prescribes an obligation for the Member States to “ensure that 
national regulatory authorities exercise their powers impartially and transparently”. 
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are their competence170 and independence.171 Securing these essential principles of both 
commercial behaviour and good governance, as distinct rules and in their totality, ultimately 
guarantees the safeguarding of consumers’ interests.  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights172 contains a special provision addressing 
consumers’ interests, which obliges the Union to ensure “a high level of consumer protection”.173 
Article 153 of the EC Treaty is a concrete expression of this obligation174 that gives a legal basis 
for the adoption of a comprehensive Community-wide consumer protection regime.175 
While it is clear that consumer protection has been recognised as a goal of regulation and is 
taken into consideration when designing, interpreting and applying the law, we argue that in the 
specific environment of electronic communications, the objective of protecting the consumer 
takes equally specific dimensions and calls for specific tools to address them. The examples 
below convey this idiosyncrasy and the complexity of the task of guaranteeing consumers 
protection in electronic communications. 
Firstly, it should be recalled that the Framework Directive of the 2002 EC regime for 
electronic communications identifies, pursuant to Article 8, consumer protection as one of the 
major policy objectives176 to be pursued by the NRAs, and thus in the implementation of the 
entire regime.177 Reflecting our thoughts on the human rights basis of consumer protection, 
Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive construes it broadly and speaks of promoting “the 
interests of the citizens of the European Union” rather than merely those of the ‘consumers’, as 
defined in Article 2 of the Directive.178 
                                                 
170 Article 3(1) of the Framework Directive. 
171 Article 3(2) of the Framework Directive. 
172 See supra note 162. The Charter is incorporated into the future Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (provisional consolidated version), OJ C 310/1, 16 December 2004. 
173 Article 38 of the Charter reads: “Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection”. 
174 Article 153 EC states notably at para. 1 that, “[i]n order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure 
a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in 
order to safeguard their interests”. Para. 2 states further that consumer protection requirements must be taken into 
account in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities. 
175 See Article 153(3) EC. See also all secondary legislation acts in force on consumer protection at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/repert/1520.htm. 
176 The other two being the promotion of competition and the development of the internal market. See Article 
8(2) and (3) of the Framework Directive.  
177 Pursuant to Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, the NRAs are to take all reasonable measures to 
promote the interests of the citizens by: (i) ensuring access to universal service; (ii) a high level of protection for 
consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in particular by ensuring the availability of simple and inexpensive 
dispute resolution procedures; (iii) a high level of protection of personal data and privacy; (iv) promoting the 
provision of clear information, in particular requiring transparency of tariffs and conditions, (v) addressing the needs 
of specific social groups, in particular disabled users; and (vi) ensuring that the integrity and security of public 
communications networks are maintained. The specific instruments that guarantee the achievement of these 
objectives are the Universal Service Directive and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 
although all Specific Directives contain provisions on and considerations of consumer protection. See e.g. Recital 5, 
Articles 1 and 13 of the Access Directive, as well as Recital 7 and Article 11 of the Authorisation Directive. 
178 The Framework Directive defines a consumer, for the purposes of the EC electronic communications 
regime, as “any natural person who uses or requests a publicly available electronic communications service for 
purposes which are outside his or her trade, business or profession”. “User”, on the other hand, is defined as “a legal 
entity or natural person using or requesting a publicly available electronic communications service”. See Article 
2(1), letters (h) and (i) of the Framework Directive.  
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Secondly, we should acknowledge one distinctive characteristic of consumer protection 
in e-communications that could be of primary importance when designing the concrete safeguard 
instruments. Namely, that it is a dynamic concept – both because of the transformed market 
environment of electronic communications resulting from the liberalisation of the sector and 
because of the rapidly changing technologies intrinsic to the “new” electronic communications.  
With regard to the former point, as discussed above, the liberalisation of 
telecommunications also entailed their transformation from public services to normal 
commercial activities. Prior to this transformation, telecommunications services were provided 
by the public operators, which were organised as administrations and were often State-owned. 
Since the liberalisation, however, the relations between the provider and the consumers are no 
longer of an “administrative” nature (i.e. between the State and the citizens) but rather based on 
common commercial terms, i.e. upon contractual relationships.179 This development, which 
tolerates greater commercial freedom, also calls for a higher level of protection and mechanisms 
put in place to ensure this.180 Furthermore, liberalisation allowed new players to enter markets, 
which accordingly gave consumers the opportunity to choose between operators, service 
packages and/or networks. This freedom of choice was created and is largely guaranteed by the 
competitive processes in the markets.181 In communications, however, due to some technical 
predeterminations, this freedom might be harmed and needs to be secured through additional 
regulation. Number portability and carrier selection and pre-selection rules182 could be seen as 
expressions of this need.183 
The plurality of market players has a definite positive effect on consumer choice both in 
terms of more, better and innovative services and in terms of lower prices.184 It could however 
also have negative repercussions that would require additional intervention in order to protect 
consumers. A pertinent example is the quality of the services offered. In that regard, under the 
                                                 
179 See Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at paras. 7.04 et seq. 
180 See Article 20 and 34(1) of the Universal Service Directive. In addition, the requirements of existing 
Community consumer protection legislation relating to contracts, in particular Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95/29, 21 April 1993) and Directive 97/7/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts (OJ L 144/19, 4 June 1997) apply to consumer transactions relating to electronic networks and services. 
181 See Recital 26 of the Universal Service Directive. 
182 The number of portability provisions ensure that all subscribers of publicly available telephone services, 
including mobile ones, can  retain their numbers on request (not only for the sake of convenience but also because 
numbers could be of significant economic or social value), independently of the undertaking providing the service 
(Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive). Carrier selection and pre-selection rules, on the other hand, enable 
access through the network of the incumbent to other (than the incumbent) operators for the provision of connection 
to and use of the public telephone network at a fixed location. This access could be granted on a call-by-call basis by 
dialling a certain code or by means of pre-selection, i.e. with a facility that overrides the pre-selected choice on a 
call-by-call basis (Article 19(1) of the Universal Service Directive). 
183 It should be pointed out that although both number portability and carrier selection and carrier pre-selection 
are viewed here as expressions of consumer protection, they have different legal nature. Pursuant to the Universal 
Service Directive, number portability is seen as an aspect of end-user rights, while carrier selection and pre-selection 
are forms of ex ante obligation that might be imposed on an undertaking with significant market power. 
184 The Tenth Communications Report notes: “The pattern of increasing consumer benefits, in terms of lower 
prices, greater choice and more innovative services, that has been evident since e-communications markets were first 
liberalised, is continuing as a result of the more competitive environment and the flexibility provided by the new 
regulatory framework. This year [2004] has seen increased choice through the entry of new operators into the 
market and more options for broadband. As competitive pressure intensifies, prices have fallen in some segments”. 
See supra note 103, at Summary, at 8 (footnotes omitted). This development has been confirmed by the Eleventh 
Communications Report, supra note 20, at 14. 
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new post-liberalisation conditions, there may be an increased need for transparency and 
“access to comprehensive, comparable and user-friendly information”.185 
Another possibly harmful consequence of the multiplicity of market players, which stems 
from the network nature of electronic communications, is the occurrence of negative network 
effects. Because of their very structure, if one node of the network breaks down or is congested, 
the negative effects spread across the whole system causing it to fail. This calls for measures to 
ensure the integrity of the network.186 The security of networks is clearly also of significance as 
regards the data being carried over them.187 
The second dimension of the dynamic concept of consumer protection in electronic 
communications environments relates to the rapid technological advances in the communications 
sector itself. Sophisticated digital networks, the possibility of instant data transfer, the access of 
more and more people to these networks and their accordingly increased use for business and 
communication create a new reality and call for suitably up-to-date modes of protection.188 
Delicate issues related to privacy, such as location data189 and the confidentiality of 
information,190 have to be properly dealt with in an environment that is increasingly 
unpredictable and by its very nature is constantly evolving.191 
Assuring an appropriate level of consumer protection could feed back positively into the 
development of new technologies, particularly since the adoption of new technologies is 
dependent on consumers’ expectations and characterised by network effects. Furthermore, on a 
more general level, “[t]he establishment of consumer confidence and trust are a prerequisite for 
                                                 
185 The Universal Service Directive prescribes a procedure, whereby undertakings are to publish “comparable, 
adequate and up-to-date information for end-users on the quality of their services”, Article 22(1)). Pursuant to 
Article 22(2), NRAs may additionally specify “the quality of service parameters to be measured, and the content, 
form and manner of information to be published, in order to ensure that end-users have access to comprehensive, 
comparable and user-friendly information”. See also Annex III of the Universal Service Directive and Article 4 of 
the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive. Generally, on quality of service, see Paul Nihoul & Peter 
Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 7.11. 
186 Article 23 of the Universal Service Directive. See also European Commission, On the review of the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications and services, supra note 145, at 28-30. 
187 “Security of networks and communications is a major area of concern for the development of the digital 
economy. Networks and information systems are now supporting services and carrying data of great value which 
can be vital to other critical infrastructures. Increased protection of the networks and information systems is 
therefore necessary against various types of attacks on their availability, authencity, integrity and confidentiality”. 
See European Commission, Electronic communications: The road to the knowledge economy, COM(2003) 65 final, 
11 February 2003, at 13. 
188 Recital 6 of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, for instance, notes: “The Internet is 
overturning traditional market structures by providing a common, global infrastructure for the delivery of a wide 
range of electronic communications services. Publicly available electronic communications services over the 
Internet open new possibilities for users but also new risks for their personal data and privacy”. See also Council 
Resolution of 19 January 1999 on the consumer dimension of the Information Society, OJ C 23/1, 28 January 1999. 
189 See Recital 35, Articles 6 and 9 of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications. 
190 Article 5 of Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications. 
191 See e.g. Decision 854/2005/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 establishing 
a multiannual Community Programme on promoting safer use of the Internet and new online technologies, OJ L 
149/1, 11 June 2005. 
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consumer acceptance of, and participation in, the information society”.192 The latter may be 
particularly important for developing and fostering the new type of participatory culture.193 
To summarise the above paragraphs, one could submit that consumer protection in the 
environment of electronic communications is particularly demanding. Although, in principle, the 
market will cater for the interests of the consumers delivering the generic benefits of 
competition, a high degree of protection will necessitate decisions that run counter to the market 
forces, to safeguard consumers. In order to meet the objective of consumer protection properly, 
the regulatory instruments should form a multi-level, coordinated and flexible system that will be 
capable of addressing communications-specific situations and can adjust swiftly to new 
circumstances. The technological and market evolution of communications and their intensified 
inclusion in the modern personal and social lives may further warrant the formulation of new 
consumer protection sub-objectives in order to effectively safeguard the public interest. 
C. On a Higher Level 
Talking about communications and the goals of communications regulation, we should 
distance ourselves from the concrete parameters of the regulatory regime(s) and their increasing 
technical complexity in order to see the development of electronic communications from a 
broader perspective. Below, we attempt to outline some of the “higher” objectives that should be 
considered in electronic communications, in particular in view of the phenomena of digitisation, 
convergence and globalisation. One could equally interpret them as an elaboration of consumer 
protection in a “higher”, human rights context. In this Section, communications are considered 
not only as “transmission systems”,194 but above all, in their special role as channels carrying and 
disseminating information and content. 
As we already mentioned, the telecommunications sector has changed. The evolution of e-
communications and “the continuing development of new technologies for the transmission and 
storage of information [have led] to organisational, commercial, technical and legal innovations 
that are having a profound impact on society in general”.195 We should also note that, “[a]s the 
use of [information and communication technology] grows, so does its impact on society”.196 
Thus, both the quantitative and the qualitative ICT-based ramifications for society are clearly 
immense. 
If we look at the Information Society as a general societal phenomenon, it would be rather 
superficial (and largely untrue) to relate its creation and development solely to the advances in 
information and communication technologies.197 We should also take into account the wider 
social, political and cultural processes that have led (and continue to lead) to the networked, 
knowledge-based environment that we are now living in. 
                                                 
192 Council Resolution on the consumer dimension of the Information Society, supra note 188, at Recital 5. 
193 See e.g. Urs Gasser & Silke Ernst, “From Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A Quick Look at Copyright 
and User Creativity in the Digital Age”, Berkman Center for Internet and Society Research Publication No 2006-05, 
June 2006. 
194 Article 2(a) of the Framework Directive. 
195 Council Resolution on the consumer dimension of the Information Society, supra note 188, at Recital 1. 
196 European Commission, i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and employment, COM(2005) 
229 final, 1 June 2005, at 9. 
197 “The Information Technology Revolution DID NOT create the network society. But without technology, 
the Network Society would not exist”. See Manuel Castells, “An Introduction to the Information Age” in Frank 
Webster (ed.), The Information Society Reader, London: Routledge, 2004, 138-149, at 139 (upper case in the 
original). 
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It is now beyond the hype to speak of the Information Society198 and most people take its 
existence and their involvement in it for granted. Despite this, there is no single and universally 
accepted theory of the Information Society.  
It is beyond the scope of the present work to engage in examination of all theories on the 
Information Society199 and/or to attempt to consolidate them. We should nonetheless clarify that 
the term we intend to use here relates to the notion of Information Society in its sociological 
connotation and not in its sense of a political programme. The political meaning is often 
dominant in the media and could be misleading. Although it does reflect some of the 
characteristics of Information Society as a social phenomenon, it is different in nature and linked 
primarily to the instrumentalisation of ICTs. Such types of project are prominent in the European 
regulatory space200 but not exclusively European.201 In fact, one of the reasons for the launching 
of the EU Information Society agenda was the fear of lagging behind in the utilisation of ICT, in 
particular in comparison to the US.202 On the global level, a vivid example of the 
                                                 
198 The concept of “Information Society” allegedly came into being some forty years ago: The economist Fritz 
Machlup, while examining the US patent system postulated the existence of a “knowledge economy” and stressed 
the role of information. See Fritz Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. 
199 See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York: Basic 
Books, 1999 (first published 1973); Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: 
The Rise of the Network Society and Vol. 2: The Power of Identity, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. For a critique, 
see Nicholas Garnham, Information Society Theory as Ideology: A Critique (2001) Studies in Communications 
Sciences, 1, 129-166. For an overview of the different theories, see Frank Webster, Theories of Information Society, 
London: Routledge, 1995 and Frank Webster (ed.), The Information Society Reader, London: Routledge, 2004. See 
also Alistair S. Duff, Information Society Studies, London: Routledge, 2001; Christopher May, The Information 
Society: A Sceptical View, Cambridge: Polity, 2002. 
200 The EU Information Society project can be traced back to the 1992 internal market programme and in 
particular, its R&D dimension. The policy document that gave real outlines and political impetus was the seminal 
Bangemann Report of 1994, “Europe and the Global Society” (EUR-OP 1994). It acknowledged that, “[t]hroughout 
the world, information and communication technologies are generating a new industrial evolution already as 
significant and far-reaching as those in the past. It is a revolution based on information, itself the expression of 
human knowledge. This revolution adds huge new capacities to human intelligence and constitutes a resource which 
changes the way we work together and the way we live together”. The European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000 
in Lisbon launched what has become known as the Lisbon strategy. It set a new strategic goal for the EU over the 
next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. In the pursuit of 
the Lisbon goal and recognising the crucial role of ICTs, a specific initiative – eEurope: Information Society for All 
– was launched. Its underlying objective is to utilise the power of ICTs and integrate them into every facet of the 
society. Following the eEurope 2002 and eEurope 2005, the current i2010 strategy strives for: (i) the completion of a 
Single European Information Space, which promotes an open and competitive internal market for information 
society and media; (ii) strengthening innovation and investment in ICT research; and (iii) achieving an inclusive 
European Information Society that promotes growth and jobs in a manner that is consistent with sustainable 
development and prioritises better public services and quality of life. See European Commission, i2010 – A 
European information society for growth and employment, supra note 196. 
201 See e.g. Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise of the 
Network Society, supra note 199, at 394-395. It was as early as 1971 when the Japanese government formulated as a 
national target the realisation of the Information Society. See Japanese Computer Usage Development Institute, The 
Plan for an Information Society: National Goal Towards the Year 2000, Tokyo, 1971, as referred to in Alistair S. 
Duff, “The Past, Present and Future of Information Policy: Towards a Normative Theory of Information Society” 
(2004) Information, Communication and Society, 7:1, 69-87. See also Knud Erik Skouby, “Information Societies: 
Toward a More Useful Concept” in Robin Mansell, Rohan Samarajva & Amy Mahan (eds.), Networking 
Knowledge for Information Society: Institutions and Intervention, Delft: DUP Science 2002, 174-178. 
202 In 1993 under the Clinton administration, Vice-President Al Gore launched the National Information 
Infrastructure (NII) Program with the purpose of creating “a seamless web of communications networks, computers, 
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instrumentalisation of communications for the achievement of other goals is the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).203 This initiative of the United Nations and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which aimed to “build a people-centred, 
inclusive and development-oriented Information Society”,204 is not the first but definitely the 
most far-reaching endeavour to exploit the benefits of ICTs.205  
Focusing on the sociological concept of Information Society and for the purposes of this 
article, we shall use a simplified “working” definition of the Information Society with an 
emphasis on its spatial and cultural aspects206 and their implications for the objectives of 
communications regulation. With this caveat in mind, “Information Society” could be defined as 
a society in which the creation, distribution and manipulation of information has become the 
most significant economic and cultural activity. Information is however to be understood not 
only in the sense of mere facts but also, more broadly, as knowledge.207 
In its spatial aspect, the Information Society could be then construed as information 
networks, “which connect locations and in consequence have dramatic effects on the 
organisation of time and space”.208 These effects could be seen both as stemming from the 
globalisation of marketplaces209 and the technologies allowing instant communications and data 
transfer, which ultimately result in a “shrinking world”.210 These “time/space compressions”211 
                                                                                                                                                             
databases, and consumer electronics that will put vast amounts of information at users’ fingertips […] [and] change 
forever the way people live, work, and interact with each other”. See US Department of Commerce, The National 
Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, Washington, DC, 15 September 1993, at Executive Summary. See 
also Herbert Kubicek, William H. Dutton & Robin Williams (eds.), The Social Sharing of Information 
Superhighways: European and American Roads to the Information Society, Frankfurt: Campus, 1997. 
203 The WSIS was constructed as a two-phase forum (Phase One: Geneva 2003 and Phase Two: Tunis 2005). 
See WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS-03/Geneva/Doc/4-E, 12 December 2003; WSIS, Plan of Action, WSIS-
03/Geneva/Doc/5-E, 12 December 2003; WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS-05/Tunis/Doc/7-E, 18 November 2005; 
WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS-05/Tunis/Doc,6(Rev.1)-E, 18 November 2005. See also 
European Commission, Towards a global partnership in the Information Society: EU perspective in the context of 
the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), COM(2003) 271 final, 19 May 2003; 
European Commission, Towards a global partnership in the Information Society: The contribution of the EU to the 
second phase of the WSIS, COM(2005) 234 final, 2 June 2005. For all relevant documents, see 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/. 
204 WSIS Declaration of Principles, id. at para. 1. 
205 For a full account of previous international and regional fora on Information Society (such as the Okinawa 
Charter on Global Information Society, 2000 or the G-7 Information Society Conference, 1995), see 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/wsis-themes/Access/IS_Principles.html. 
206 Building upon the analysis of Frank Webster, who identifies five definitions of an Information Society, 
namely: (i) technological; (ii) economic; (iii) occupational; (iv) spatial and (v) cultural. See Frank Webster (1995), 
id. at 6 et seq. 
207 William H. Dutton, Social Transformation in an Information Society: Rethinking Access to You and the 
World, Paris: UNESCO, 2004, at 27. 
208 Frank Webster (1995), supra note 199, at 18. 
209 On globalisation (in particular economic globalisation), see Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of 
the World Trade Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 3 et seq. See also an excellent 
collection of contributions on globalisation in David Held & Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations 
Reader, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity, 2003. 
210 See “The Shrinking World: The Impact of Transportation Technology on Effective Distance” in Anthony G. 
Oettinger, “Information Technologies, Government and Governance: Some Insights from History”, Incidental Paper, 
Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, September 1998, available at 
http://www.pirp.harvard.edu. See also John B. Thompson, “The Globalization of Communication” in David 
Held/Anthony McGrew, id. 246-259. 
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have numerous repercussions and mostly notably in our context lead to increasing 
interconnectedness within the information networks. The emergence of all-encompassing global 
networks, on the other hand, underlines the significance of the flow of information,212 i.e. the 
content that spreads through them. 
Undoubtedly, the global reach and technological potency of these infrastructures have 
allowed for vast amounts of information to be disseminated. Especially now that digitisation has 
become ubiquitous, all types of content (audio, video or text) expressed in ones and zeros could 
be distributed over any network (telephone, cable or mobile) at the speed of light. New forms of 
communication are emerging (such as weblogs213 and online social networking platforms214) and 
together these developments have led to a fundamental shift in the traditional channels of 
distribution of content.  
The means of distribution have accordingly changed the content being distributed. In the 
words of Jean Baudrillard, “there is more and more information, and less and less meaning”.215 
The emergence of transnational communication conglomerates as key players in the global 
system of communication and information diffusion216 has led to a simultaneous transformation 
of the type and variety of content being distributed. Formats and contents of TV programmes, 
films and shows have become increasingly homogeneous.217 Although this globalisation and 
“uniformisation” of content do not necessarily (and automatically) mean a cultural desert, where 
diversity has perished and the rules are made by transnational corporations,218 they do lead to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
211 As referred to by Anthony Giddens. See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in 
the Late Modern Age, Cambridge: Polity, 1991. On the “Age of Simultaneity”, see Neal M. Rosendorf, “Social and 
Cultural Globalization: Concepts, History, and America’s Role” in Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue (eds.), 
Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 109-134, at 115 et seq. 
212 Frank Webster (1995), supra note 199, at 19, referring to Manuel Castells, The Informational City: 
Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban Regional Process, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 
213 See e.g. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Von Blogs, Phlogs, Vlogs und Flogs”, 29 August 2005; Dan Gillmor, We 
the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People, Sepastobol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2004. 
214 See e.g. http://www.myspace.com and http://www.facebook.com. 
215 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, London: Sage, 1993, at 5, as referred to by Frank Webster 
(1995), supra note 199, at 22. On the “multi-channel paradox”, whereby despite the diversity of channels, there is no 
actual diversity of content, see Mónica Ariño, “Competition Law and Pluralism in European Digital Broadcasting: 
Addressing the Gaps” (2004) Communications and Strategies, 54, 97-128, at 98-99. 
216 See e.g. Robert W. McChesney, “The New Global Media” in David Held & Anthony McGrew, supra note 
209, 278-285; Christoph Beat Graber, Handel und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht der WTO. Völkerrechtliche, 
ökonomische und kulturpolitische Grundlagen einer globalen Medienordnung, Berne: Staempfli, 2003, at 45 et seq. 
217 For a critique of the cultural industries and on the homogeneity of content, see Christoph Beat Graber, id. at 
18 et seq. For arguments against homogeneity, see Gaetano Romano, “Technologische, witschaftliche und kulturelle 
Entwicklungen der audiovisuellen Medienmärkte in den letzten Jahren” in Christoph Beat Graber, Michael 
Girsberger & Mira Nenova, Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual 
Services, Zurich: Schulthess, 2004, 1-13, at 4 et seq. For an interesting comment on the global power of American 
popular culture (influencing through attraction rather than coercion), see Neal M. Rosendorf, supra note 211, at 117 
et seq. A converged communications industry with few voices was in fact predicted as early as 1947, when Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer saw a “fusion of all arts into one work” in the production by the communications 
industry in the United States of cultural products for the undifferentiated masses that would result in standardisation 
of the product. They feared this result would drive out individual creativity and cultural diversity. See Theodor 
Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso, 1979 (first published 1947). 
218 See e.g. Herbert Schiller, “Striving for Communication Dominance: A Half-Century Review” in Daya 
Kishan Thussu (ed.), Electronic Empires: Global Media and Local Resistance, London: Edward Arnold, 1998, at 17-
26. 
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completely changed media and communications environment that we are now faced with.219 
An environment that has the potential for affecting acutely and changing our culture.220 
To use the words of Manuel Castells, “[f]or all the science fiction ideology and commercial 
hype surrounding the emergence of the so-called ‘information superhighway’, we can hardly 
underestimate its significance. The potential integration of text, images, and sounds in the same 
system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen time (real and delayed) along a global 
network, in conditions of open and affordable access, does fundamentally change the character 
of communication. And communication decisively shapes culture, because, as Postman writes, 
‘we do not see … reality … as ‘it’ is, but as our languages are. And our languages are our media. 
Our media are our metaphors. Our metaphors create the content of our culture”.221 
Without engaging in (the rather difficult222) analysis of the concept of culture,223 for the 
purposes of this article, we can conclude that the Information Society is a new type of society 
that has multiple ramifications for media and communications, and consequently for culture. It is 
moreover not just a given reality but also a process, an evolution, which could be further shaped. 
Regulatory frameworks should thus address the present ramifications of the Information Society, 
while simultaneously providing for the protection of a certain “package” of values in this 
development and their constant reassertion. This set of values forms precisely what we 
formulated at the beginning of the Section as higher objectives. 
The changing dynamics of the communications industries in the context of the Information 
Society does not mean that everything has changed and the “old” values have been emptied of 
their content.224 Yet, there have been attempts to formulate “new” rights that would fit better into 
the new communications environment. Jan van Cuilenburg and Pascal Verhoest suggest, for 
instance, in the context of discussing convergence, the formulation of two new concepts, namely 
“freedom of communication” and “access”. The former is intended to mean the right to send or 
                                                 
219 John B. Thompson, “The Globalization of Communication” in David Held & Anthony McGrew, supra note 
209, 246-259. Thompson suggests notably that, “the appropriation of globalized symbolic materials involves […] 
the accentuation of symbolic distancing from the spatial-temporal contexts of everyday life”. Id. at 256 (emphasis in 
the original). See also Christoph Beat Graber, supra note 216, at 22 et seq. 
220 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network 
Society, supra note 199, at 357 (emphasis added). 
221 Id. at 356, referring to Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show 
Business, New York: Penguin Books, 1985, at 15 (abridged in the original). See also in that sense, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge, 1999 (also available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5740, who famously noted at para. 5.6. that: “The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world (in the original: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt”). 
222 It was in 1952 when Kroeber and Kluckholn compiled a list of more than 200 different definitions of culture 
(see Alfred L. Kroeber & Clyde Kluckholn et al., Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, 
Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952). Since then the concept has only gained in complexity and controversies 
despite the ample literature discussing it. 
223 For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of culture and the relevant theories, see Christoph Beat Graber, 
supra note 216, at 11 et seq. See also Nicholas Garnham, Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity: Arguments 
about the Media and Social Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, at 140 et seq.; Anthony D. Smith, 
“Towards a Global Culture” in David Held & Anthony McGrew, supra note 209, 278-285. 
224 P.H. Longstaff remarks in that regard that, “[a] fallacious idea of the so-called Information Revolution is 
that everything has changed and that the old rules no longer apply. This is not the first time a new technology has 
made a new means of communication possible and, at the same time, made it possible for existing communications 
systems to evolve and merge into one another. Those who thought everything was new had an underdeveloped 
knowledge of history. The fundamentals of communication, networks and competition have not changed. It’s the 
technology (and to some extent the broader scope) that’s different”. See P.H. Longstaff, The Communications 
Toolkit, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, at 2. 
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not to send, and to receive or not receive messages without any hindrance by any third party, 
while “access” signifies the possibility for individuals, groups and organisations to share 
society’s communications resources.225 Similarly, in the course of the preparatory work of the 
WSIS, there was an attempt to formulate a “right to communicate”. The draft declaration on the 
“right to communicate” stressed the necessity for a new human right, partly embracing existing 
rights and partly composed of new ones, such as the right to access to technologies or the right of 
protection against cyber crimes and cyber terrorism.226 
Urs Gasser addresses the issues more comprehensively and suggests three core values as 
cornerstones of a regime.227 The first is informational autonomy, which builds upon the theses of 
Yochai Benkler,228 and is to be understood as encompassing three elements, namely the freedom 
to make choices among alternative sets of information, ideas and opinions; the right to express 
beliefs and opinions and finally, in a digital networked environment, the right of the user to 
participate in the creation of information, knowledge and entertainment. The second core 
democratic value is diversity in the sense of a wide variety of information from a great variety of 
competing sources. Gasser advocates that, “a diverse information environment in its current 
incarnation not only improves deliberation and decision-making processes. Rather, the diversity 
of information, knowledge, and entertainment is an important aspect of the broader concept of 
cultural diversity which has been recognized as a fundamental value of our societies”.229 Finally, 
as a third core value, he identifies high quality information, which is to be construed not only in 
its functional and cognitive aspects but also notably, in its aesthetic and ethical dimensions. 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the latter approach and its arguably more adequate fit to 
the environment of contemporary communications, we hold that there is no need to formulate 
new rights to respond to the new modes of communication. It is, on the contrary, perhaps now 
more important than ever to affirm the innate human values. As stated in a key Background Note 
of the WSIS, “[t]he human rights standards developed on the basis of the United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitute a set of internationally adopted norms, 
relevant to all spheres of life, including the Information Society”.230 The established human 
rights are indeed flexible enough to capture all of the above situations, while also benefiting from 
the jurisprudence of the national, regional and international courts interpreting and applying 
these rights. Furthermore, taking a different perspective, one could say that what we are dealing 
with here, are above all regime collusions,231 i.e. collusions between values inherent to different 
                                                 
225 Jan van Cuilenburg & Pascal Verhoest, “Free and Equal Access: In Search of Policy Models for Converging 
Systems” (1998) Telecommunications Policy, 22:3, 171-181. 
226 The approach encountered heavy criticism because of its supposedly too far-reaching consequences and did 
not materialise in the WSIS final documents. See WSIS, Statement on the Right to Communicate by Article 19 
Global Campaign for Free Expression, WSIS/PC-2/CONTR/95-E, London, 14 February 2003. 
227 Urs Gasser, “Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead” (2006) Yale Journal of Law 
and Technology, 9, 124-157, at 150-157. 
228 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2006, 133-175. 
229 Urs Gasser, supra note 227, at 152. 
230 WSIS, Background Note on the Information Society and Human Rights, WSIS/PC-3/CONTR/178-E, 27 
October 2003, at 2 (emphasis added). 
231 In the sense formulated by Lescano and Teubner. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, 
“Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) Michigan 
Journal of International Law, 25, 999-1046. 
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social systems, such as economy versus art. Since each social system is bound by its 
language,232 communication may be facilitated if we use the “old” terms. 
Following this line of reasoning, while acknowledging the fact that, “[a]ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”,233 we could identify the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression as the most central234 of these standards235 in the realm of 
communications.236 The freedom of expression is key as an individual right but also in its 
specific interpretation in the sense of pluralism,237 particularly important in the contemporary 
media society. Human rights could be further viewed as guarantees and enablers of cultural 
diversity,238 the protection of which is critical in light of the implications of the changed 
                                                 
232 Or “binary code”, as defined by Niklas Luhmann. See Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. See also Gunther Teubner, Richard Nobles & David Schiff, “The Autonomy of the 
Law: An Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis” in David Schiff & Richard Nobles (eds.), Jurisprudence, London: 
Butterworth, 2003, at Chapter 19. 
233 “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis”. See UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF. 157/23, 25 June 1993, at para. 5, 
reiterated by the World Summit on Information Society, WSIS Declaration of Principles, Document WSIS-
03/Geneva/Doc/4-E, 12 December 2003, at para. 3. 
234 The centrality of the right to freedom of expression and information is reiterated in the WSIS, Background 
Note on the Information Society and Human Rights, supra note 230, especially at 2-3. See also United Nations, 
Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur Abid 
Hussain, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/45, E/CN.4/1995/32, 14 December 1994, at 
para. 35. 
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(Article 7 UDHR), the right to privacy (Article 12 UDHR), intellectual property rights (Article 27 UDHR), the right 
to standard of living (Article 25, para. 1 UDHR) and the right to education (Article 26 UDHR). See WSIS, 
Background Note on the Information Society and Human Rights, supra note 230 and Deborah Hurley, Pole Star: 
Human Rights in the Information Society, Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, 2003. 
236 The right of freedom of opinion and expression is formulated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (GA Resolution 217 A (iii), UN Doc. A/810, 10 December 1948) as including “freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers”. It is reiterated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(supra note 166), thereby making it binding and fully applicable to the parties (by 1 September 2005, 154 countries 
were parties to the Covenant). The freedom of opinion and expression has been explicitly reaffirmed at the European 
level as well. See Article 10 of the Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome (supra note 166) and Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (supra note 162).  
237 See European Court of Human Rights, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 
1993, Application No 13914/88 and 15041/89, 17 EHRR 93. At para. 38 therein, the Court noted that, “[imparting] 
information and ideas of general interest […] cannot be successfully accomplished unless it is grounded in the 
principle of pluralism”. For a comprehensive analysis, see also Christoph Beat Graber, supra note 216, at 110 et seq. 
238 See Article 4 and 5 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted at the 31st Session of the 
General Conference of UNESCO, 2 November 2001, Paris and Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted at the 33rd Session of the General Conference of 
UNESCO, 20 October 2005. On cultural diversity, see Christoph Beat Graber, supra note 216, at 73 et seq.; Joost 
Smiers, Arts under Pressure, New York: Zed Books, 2004 and the collection of contributions in Christoph Beat 
Graber, Michael Girsberger & Mira Nenova (eds.), Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity, supra note 217. On the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Diversity, see Christoph Beat Graber, “The New UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance to the WTO” (2006) Journal of International Economic Law, 
19:3, 553-574 and Rachael Craufurd Smith, “The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural 
Expressions: Building a New World Information and Communication Order?” (2007) International Journal of 
Communication, 1, 24-55. 
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communications environment outlined above: “Freedom of expression, media pluralism, 
multilingualism, equal access to art and to scientific and technological knowledge, including in 
digital form, and the possibility for all cultures to have access to the means of expression and 
dissemination are the guarantees of cultural diversity”.239 
The above covers only a tiny fraction of the complex and diverse issues emerging from the 
cultural aspects of the Information Society and their relation to human rights standards.240 The 
purpose of this Section was not to provide an exhaustive commentary on the debate, but rather to 
show that there are indeed higher goals with immediate relevance to communications. We should 
acknowledge that infrastructure could influence the content being carried over it, or alter the 
transport environment in ways that have a considerable impact on the content and/or on the 
access to this content. Consequently, technical transformations (notably, digitisation) could have 
grave effects on the innate human values, such as freedom of expression and information and 
ultimately, cultural diversity and identity.  
Considering the institutional aspect of human rights and not construing them simply as 
individual rights,241 they need to be reflected both in the regulatory regime for electronic 
communications and in its implementation. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,242 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,243 the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,244 and in the EC context, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,245 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union246 entail obligations with regard to the protection of 
human rights. The EC has formulated also explicit provisions for the promotion of culture247 and 
provides in the current regime for electronic communications that, “[n]ational regulatory 
authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies 
aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism”.248 It 
                                                 
239 Article 6 of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and Article 2(1) of the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, id. 
240 For a comprehensive analysis of the cultural rights at the global and regional levels, see Christoph Beat 
Graber, supra note 216, at 99 et seq. 
241 Christoph Beat Graber, id. at 100, referring also to Walter Kälin, "Menschenrechtsverträge als 
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Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional Issues, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2003, 237-
255, at 252 et seq. 
248 See Article 8(1) of the Framework Directive, at para. 3. 
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remains to be seen, however, how, in reality, these intangible values will be effectively 
protected against the sweeping technological and market developments in electronic 
communications, especially considering the existing fragmentation of legal instruments at the 
international level.249 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A full account of the goals of regulation and in particular, of communications regulation, is 
not possible. To use the vivid comparison of Mel Kenny, any attempt at identifying the precise 
goals of regulation could be indeed similar to “nailing a jellyfish”.250 
Our analysis, based on elements of the primary and secondary EC law, but seen from a 
broader perspective, although not exhaustive, clearly reveals the multiplicity and diversity of 
objectives that can be conceptualised in the regulatory environment of electronic 
communications. These range from the conventional pursuit of consumer welfare through 
universal service to some higher goals of specific importance in communications, such as 
protection of freedom of expression and cultural diversity.  
It is important to acknowledge that these goals cannot be framed into a neat hierarchical 
system where the policy-makers and/or the regulatory agencies could order their tasks in such 
terms as “firstly deal with competition on the markets; secondly, with innovation; thirdly, with 
culture, etc.” There is indeed a simultaneous “first priority” quality of all the objectives, both 
economic and societal, which renders the design of an adequate “toolbox” fairly intricate. 
Furthermore, one can observe intense positive and negative dependencies (trade-offs) between 
the different objectives in that they feed into each other’s achievement (e.g. internal market 
promotion and standardisation), or conversely, one is accomplished to the detriment of another 
(e.g. intellectual property protection and standardisation). As the somewhat deeper analysis of 
innovation further proved, there are a number of factors stemming from the specificities of 
electronic communications that complicate the pursuit of a single goal. The example of universal 
service showed, however, that the policy goals can evolve and be filled with new substance. A 
possible conclusion to be drawn from the systematic examination of the objectives of 
communications regulation is that there are complex linkages between them that ultimately form 
a system of variable interdependence, where a specific objective may change in response to a 
particular change within the system, thereby influencing all other elements.  
To reduce the abstractness of such a conclusion, we could refer to a real-life example, 
namely that of Digital Cinema Initiatives (DCI).251 DCI is a joint project of the six major 
Hollywood motion picture studios (Disney, Fox, MGM, Paramount, Sony, Universal and Warner 
Brothers) inaugurated in March 2002 with the goal of developing a system specification for 
digital cinema.252 DCI pursues the adoption of this digital cinema standard and assists its 
deployment in movie theatres. DCI could be construed as a lucid example of new technological 
                                                 
249 Christoph Beat Graber, supra note 216, at 113. 
250 Mel Kenny, supra note 10, at 101. Mel Kenny makes the comparison in the context of the objectives of 
competition law and not in a general sense, as we take the liberty of doing here. 
251 See http://www.dcimovies.com. 
252 Digital cinema refers to the use of digital technology to distribute and produce films. Films could be 
distributed via hard drives, DVDs, satellite or other networks. The economic advantages of digital cinema are 
immense: production and distribution costs fall radically (e.g. Rick McCallum, a producer of Star Wars Episode II: 
Attack of the Clones, said that it cost USD 16,000 for 220 hours of digital tape where a comparable amount of film 
would have cost USD 1.8 million) and economies of scale and scope are manifest. 
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developments (stemming from digitisation and convergence) and market developments (as an 
industry response to applying the technology and creating a new standard). Against the backdrop 
of our elaborations above, we could identify the DCI project as exhibiting strong network effects, 
but although it creates positive economies of scale and scope, it entails dangers of lock-ins to the 
developed standard. Competition between standards is seriously reduced and although the DCI 
specifications are arguably an open architecture, the question of access is a thorny one. 
Furthermore, one cannot help but notice the competition law issues since the standard is 
developed by the six major Hollywood studios, which hold the lion’s share of the media market’s 
pie. This concentration of market power along the entire value chain of production and 
distribution of content, including control over the distributing networks and the industry standard 
clearly endangers the “higher” goals of pluralism and diversity, as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, non-digitised content has no distribution channel in the DCI scheme. 
Against the above example and reiterating our interim conclusions, we hold that there 
should be increased awareness of the multiple effects of every event and/or decision in the 
complex communications system. Above all, regulatory frameworks will have to achieve 
balance within the system253 taking into consideration the unintended consequences of single 
actions. The pursuit of balance will further have to accommodate the dynamism of electronic 
communications. The objectives would thus have to be maintained, while balancing the 
flexibility to meet new situations against the certainty inherent to regulation.254 
In conclusion, one can submit that economic efficiency and public interest objectives form 
two fundamental and complementary sets against which the likely performance of markets 
should be judged and specific regulatory criteria developed. Identifying regulatory criteria in this 
way will allow any corresponding measures to be clearly targeted at meeting the defined 
objectives, thus minimising possible distortionary and secondary effects on the market. However, 
since communications are a system of technological, economic and social linkages that 
profoundly influences the way we live, an adequate regulatory framework should also be able to 
take account of and address the relevant higher objectives, taken in the broad context of social 
welfare. 
                                                 
253 P.H. Longstaff notes in that regard that, “[s]trategies that are good for an individual agent are often a 
disaster for the group”. See P.H. Longstaff, supra note 224, 19. 
254 See Damien Geradin & Michel Kerf, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, at 338 et seq. 
